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PREFACE

The Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
as amended, provided for federal Violent-Offender Incarceration and
Truth-in-Sentencing (VOI/TIS) incentive grants to the states and U.S.
territories. These grants are to be used to increase the capacity of
state correctional systems to confine serious and violent offenders.
Congress and the U.S. Department of Justice agreed to devote some of the
committed funds intended for these grants to evaluating the actions they
support. This evaluation addresses the impacts of recent sentencing
practices on changes in correctional management and the expanded use of
privatization, as a complement to RAND'S national evaluation of the
implementation and early outcomes of VOI/TIS incentive grants to states.
RANDls evaluation tracked and documented changes in sentencing

changes, classification, health care, programming, professionalism of
correctional employees, and costs. Information on prison management was
collected at a national level and through state-level case studies in
seven states (California,Florida, New York, North Carolina, Oregon,
Texas, and Washington).

In addition, detailed case studies of

privatization were conducted in three of the seven prison management
case study states--Florida,North Carolina, and Texas.
This report is one in a series of RAND studies on the impact of
truth-in-sentencing and other "get tough" policies on state and local
corrections. Other reports for interested readers include:
Susan Turner, Terry Fain, Peter W. Greenwood, Elsa Chen, and James
Chiesa, with Stella Bart, Judith Greene, Daniel Krislov, Eric Larson,
Nancy Merritt, and Albert Hyun Yoon (20011, National Evaluation of the
Viol en t offender Incarcera tion/Truth - i n - Sent encing Incentive Grant
Program, DRU-2634-NIJIFinal Report to the National Institute of
Justice.
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SUMMARY

It

INTRODUCTION

Across the nation, states are joining the growing movement to !!get
tough1'on crime and criminals. Three-strikes, mandatory minimums, and
Truth-in-Sentencing legislation are all attempts to keep serious
offenders in prison for longer periods (of time and promote public
safety. Most generally, Truth-in-Sentencingrefers to the requirement
that offenders serve a substantial portion of their imposed prison
sentence. This is in contrast to correctional policies that allow for
release of offenders before they have served their full court-imposed
sentence. Truth-in-Sentencing laws are intended to both deter offenders
from committing crime and help restore the credibility of the criminal
justice system in the eyes of the public.
The Federal government recently launched an effort to encourage
states to adopt Truth-in-Sentencing and other forms of "get tough"
legislation. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
as amended, provided for Federal Violen1:-Offender Incarceration and
Truth-in-Sentencing (VOI/TIS) incentive grants to the states. This
legislation was largely designed to increase the capacity of state
correctional systems to confine serious and violent offenders for longer
periods of time and to assure the public that these offenders would
serve a substantial portion of their sentences (Office of Justice
Programs 1996).

Specifically, the purposes of the VOI/TIS incentive

grants are to provide states with funds to:

0

Build or expand bed capacity in correctional facilities for
confinement of offenders convicted of a Part 1 violent crimes
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or juveniles adjudicated for acts which, if committed by an
adult, would constitute a Part 1 violent crime1
0

Build or expand temporary or permanent correctional facilities,
including facilities on military bases, prison barges, and boot
camps, to house convicted nonviolent offenders and criminal
aliens, for the purpose of freeing up existing prison space for

0

offenders convicted of Part 1 violent crime
,
Build or expand local jail capacity2

VOI/TIS INCENTIVE GRANTS

A state may apply for TIS grants by meeting one of two criteria:

0

It has implemented laws requiring convicted violent offenders
to serve at least 85 percent of their sentence or resulting in
such offenders serving on average 85 percent of their sentence

0

It has enacted a law providing that within three years of its
grant application it will require convicted violent offenders
to serve at least 85 percent of their sentence

The percentage of the total TIS funds that each state is allocated
for a given year is equal to the percentage of the nation's violent
crimes committed in that state over the three years preceding the
allocation. The grant is thus both merit- and need-based, because all
states need to show statutory or de facto 85 percent truth in
sentencing, but their amount of funding is contingent on "need" for
federal assistance to combat violent crime.
For VOI funding, a state need only give assurances that it has
implemented or will implement policies ensuring that

Part 1 violent crimes are defined by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation as murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, rape, robbery,
and aggravated assault (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2000).
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I
0

violent offenders serve "a substantial portion" of their
sentences

0

their punishment is

0

the time served is "appropriately related" to the violent-

Ilsuf

ficiently severe"

offender status and sufficient to protect the public
I

States meeting these criteria are said to be eligible for "Tier 118
funding.3 A state can receive a greater share of VOI funding (Tier 2)
if it can show that since 1993 it has increased any of the following:

0

the percentage of convicted vicilent offenders that have been
sentenced to prison

0

the average time they have served

0

the average percentage of their sentence they have served

A state can also receive a greater share of VOI funding (Tier 3)
if it can show it has accomplished either of the following:

0

since 1993, increased the percentage of convicted violent
offenders that have been sentenced to prison and the average
percentage of their sentence they have served

0

within the past three years, increased by at least 10 percent
the number of convicted violent offenders committed by the
courts to prison

RAND recently completed a national evaluation of the

implementation and early outcome experiences of the VOI/TIS incentive

CPO 1999 Application Kit, p. 2.
3This terminology has been adopted .in implementing the Act; it is
not present in the Act itself.
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grant program (see Turner et at. 2001). The current study was designed
to complement the national evaluation, examining adaptations in prison
management made by state correctional agencies in response to VOI/TIS.
Specifically, the current study addresses the following research
questions:

What management changes have been made by state correctional
agencies in order to deal with the increase in the numbers of
violent offenders being incarcerated, many for much longer
periods than in the past?
0

What additional safety and training procedures have been
instituted for correctional staff in order to deal with the
increase in violent offenders?

0

HOW

does the increase in vio1en.t offenders affect the type and

extent of programming (e.g., education, prison employment)
health care and safety procedures?
0

What types of offenders, programs, or services fall within
private corrections? What has been the experience of private
corrections in terms of inmate and officer safety, infractions,
accountability and costs?

METHODOLOGY

The current study answers these questions using a three-tiered
methodology. Nationwide characteristics on prison management were
gathered for all states. Case studies on prison management were
conducted for seven states (California, Florida, New York, North
Carolina, Oregon, Texas, and Washington).

Detailed case studies, that

included site visits, were conducted on issues related to privatization
in three of the seven states--Texas,North Carolina, and Florida.
For purposes of the present analyses, TIS classification is based
on funding, not on whether the state passed T I S legislation--although
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I

'

all but three of the states that received TIS funding also passed
qualifying TIS legislation. New Mexico, Wisconsin, and the District of
Columbia were not included as TIS states in analyses, since they enacted
TIS later than the most recently available data. We separate out Texas,
since its effect--particularlyfor quantitative measures of crime and
sentences--swamps the effects of other non-TIS states.

I

FINDINGS

,

Limitations of the Current Study

Like our national evaluation of the implementation and early
outcomes of VOI/TIS on crime rates, prison sentences, admissions, and
time served (see Turner et al. 20011, the current evaluation also
operated under several constraints.
First, our evaluation was conducted early in the implementation of
VOI/TIS; the full impact of VOI/TIS will not be seen until years from
now.

States do not have to spend VOI/TIS funds during the year in which

they are received--stateshave up to four years from the year in which
funds are awarded. Thus states have not yet built all the beds
originally envisioned for VOI/TIS offenders.

In addition, the impact of

TIS legislation will not be felt until violent offenders begin to serve
the portions of their sentences that are beyond that which was
historically served. Second, although we can examine the differential
effects of states that did and did not receive TIS funding, we cannot
determine the impact of VOI/TIS funds overall. This is because all
states received funding from the program.

We do not have a set of

states, for comparison purposes, that dil5 not participate in the VOI/TIS
program. Thus, changes we observe over time may be due to other events,
sentencing changes, or national trends nl>t associated with VOI/TIS.
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National Analyses of Prison Management Tregds
I

Overall, our national analyses suggest one of two patterns.
Changes in some measures have been occurring over the past decade and
Some measures have remained fairly constant. We do not observe sharp
changes for TIS states about the time of many states were passing TIS
legislation in 1994.

In some instances, TIS states show higher levels

of prison management concerns (such as percent of inmates at high/close
custody, misconduct reports), but for other variabies, non-TIS states
show higher levels (such as inmate assaults). We did not find strong
evidence for our hypotheses regarding the potential impact of TIS on
prison management variables. This may be due to several reasons.
Averaging over states in these analyses may mask important state level
experiences.

In addition, data are available only during the first

several years after TIS legislation was passed in many states. As we
found in our national VOI/TIS evaluation, we may need to wait several
more years in order to gauge the impact of such sentencing policies.
Prison Management Case Study Interviews

Based on our case study interviews, it appears the VOI/TIS and
other get tough policies have had at least some impact on prison
management within individual states. Most of our interviewees reported
longer sentences, greater numbers of older inmates, and increased
crowding. These conditions were not unanimously considered a direct
result of VOI/TIS, but were often considered the result of a rising
prison population, to which VOI/TIS has contributed. One consistent
theme was the anticipation that VOI/TIS and other get tough policies
would have an impact on prison management in the future. TIS and other
changes in sentencing policy are relatively new and most of our
respondents expect greater impact, in terms of crowding, aging inmates,
and costs, will be observed as more inmates are sentenced under the new
policies.
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Privatization Case Studies

The privatization case studies were designed to examine and
document management practices in state lcorrectional systems with more
than a few years of experience with prison privatization, and to explore
whether the provisions of VOI/TIS, or other elements of the movement
promoting "get tough" legislation have (affectedhow states approach the
issue of privatization.
For more than fifteen years private prison marketing efforts have
been built on assertions that they could deliver higher quality services
at a lower price than public correctional agencies. The public debates
about whether a state should include prison privatization among the
approaches taken to improve or expand the correctional system are
usually couched in terms of correctiona:lcosts and efficiency, but the
evidence to date does not offer solid support for the claims made by
proponents. There are other factors, however, that underlie and
influence the decision process.
The decision to privatize prison operations is ultimately made in
the political arena, by legislators and governors and not by a state's
professional correctional managers.

Over the course of the fifteen-year

history of this industry, all states have faced huge increases in their
prison populations but fewer than half have chosen to address this
problem by contracting with private companies to build or manage state
prisons within their political boundaries.4 Regional political
traditions and the political cultures appear to play a predominant role
in determining whether a state will move to privatize its prisons. For
example, almost all of the early contracts were for facilities built and
operated in traditionally conservative lllright-to-workll
states, where
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correctional labor unions are weak or non-existent, and strong
bi-partisan support for private prisons prevailed. Specific VOI/TIS or
"get tought1measures that have been incorporated in a state's criminal
justice policies and practices do not appear to play a major role.
Our case studies show that private management of prisons is often
associated with specific patterns of shortcomings and deficiencies
(e.g., higher rates of staff turnover, problems with classification and
inmate discipline, deficient provision of basic selrvices, higher rates
of violent assaults). Many of these problems can be traced to the
primary objective of the industry: to reap profits from the high-risk
business of operating prisons. Once the political decision to privatize
is made, a state's correctional managers face a number of administrative
challenges, as we discuss below.
Considerations for Private Prisons.

Given the strong financial

incentives to cut costs in order maximize profits while remaining
'fcompetitive,"
performance of private prison contractors becomes a key
issue. Some have argued that the proper' role of public correctional
management in these transactions should be to set high performance
standards and outcome measures, and then to stand back and let the
private sector "innovatel' its way toward1 more efficient ways to do
business. Austin's review of the current state of private correctional
practice, however, reveals scant evidence of innovation (Austin and
Coventry 1999).

Private companies have often hired veteran managers

from the public corrections systems. In Minnesota, private companies
mimicked the public system in some ways, while failing to provide
required service delivery in a number of areas (Greene 2000).

Many states-- e.g., New York and Illinois--have no involvement
with prison privatization, though they may contract with for-profit
vendors of community corrections, halfway houses and the like. Some
states--e.g.,Hawaii and Wisconsin--have sent prisoners to be confined
in private prisons located elsewhere, but have not yet embraced the
concept of privately-operated prisons within their borders.
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I

I

Given this experience, public managers are wise to provide
I

precisely detailed prescriptions for every aspect of prison operations
as they issue requests for proposals and negotiate contracts. A review
of the experience with prison privatization in the three case-study
states suggests that such administrative practices are essential to
managing the risks and help to secure adequate levels of performance
from private prison vendors.

Specifica1,ly:
I

0

Clear and detailed specifications €or every aspect of prison
operations need to be incorporated in "requests for proposalsv1
f o r private prison operation to establish comprehensive

performance expectations and set an unambiguous framework for
contracting, and for management oversight, monitoring, and
enforcement of contract requirements. Contracts must
incorporate a detailed, enforceable staffing plan, and should
specify quantified performance measures €or delivery of
security services, healthcare, and correctional programs.
0

strict monitoring and enforcement are needed to enforce the
terms of the contract. This requires daily onsite monitoring
by a dedicated full-time experiienced corrections professional;
careful documentation of operational deficiencies and problems;
and enforcement sanctions with specific monetary sanctions
(i.e., per diem adjustments) that will be triggered when
explicit performance benchmarks are not met.

A decade and a half of experience with privatization in the U.S.

evokes a number of other cautionary principles for approaching
correctional privatization:

0

A jurisdiction cannot afford to privatize so large a proportion

of institutional corrections that the system becomes dependent
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on private management and cannot bargain to its best
advantage--or finds itself unable to take over prison
operations (or absorb the contracted population load) when
things go wrong. The proportican of privatized prison
operations in a jurisdiction should therefore remain quite low.
For the same reason, jurisdictions choosing to privatize prison
operations should maintain ownership of the facilities
involved. This will help to avoid impediments to converting
private prisons to public management if the costs of
privatization (financial or political) prove to be too high.
0

Jurisdictions should have clear and realistic objectives and
expectations. The consensus among credible researchers is that
the public cannot expect to obtain much, if any, tax-dollar
savings through privatization. Adequate funding for security
services and prison programs is essential. Vendors who propose
per diems that appear (at least on paper) to produce
substantial savings may be bidding deliberately and
irresponsibly low. Politicians who make expansive claims of
savings through privatization may be ignoring the inevitable
hidden costs, such as increased complaints of improper
treatment in private facilities.

0

Jurisdictions should not contract for prison beds outside of
their political boundaries, nor should they allow IIspec"
prisons to be built or operated within them.

The track record

amassed by private prison operators that contract for
out-of-state prisoners is poor.

The logistics of monitoring

and enforcing contracts for beds located hundreds or thousands
of miles away are difficult. The lack of adequate local and
state jurisdictional control over I'spec" prisons has given rise
to a set of operational, legal, and political problems that
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have not been sufficiently addressed by any host jurisdiction
I

to date.
0

Private prison contractors should be required to pay prevailing
wages and provide comparable benefit levels for private prison
staff. At the time of our study, the strains placed by a
strong economy on the correctional labor pool were affecting
public prison systems adversely--especially in states like
Texas, where the prison system expanded at a rate that has
stripped an already tight labor market.

Private prison

,

operators offering lower compensation for line staff than is
afforded them by public correctional agencies (whether to
effect savings or to increase profits) found it increasingly
difficult to fill staff vacancies and cover key security posts.
In many private prisons the result has been a security force
that is under-qualified, insufficiently experienced, and
exhausted though excessive, involuntary overtime.
0

Given the patterns of structural deficiencies mentioned above,
the best results with private prison operations may be achieved
by limiting contractors to provision of housing and services
for the least challenging prisoners.

This means restricting

the private market to relatively low-security prisoners who are
not prone to violence, and who are nearing the end of their
prison sentences and therefore have every incentive for good
behavior. The track record is poor where public managers have
not taken great care in selection of candidates for transfer to
private prisons, or where vendors have been willing to accept
prisoners beyond their management capacity. This has been
especially true in instances where prisoner classification
tools were defective or overridden by contingent circumstances,
or where prisoners in need of expensive, individualized
services (e.g., juvenile offendlers, mentally ill prisoners)
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were transferred to private facilities that were not equipped
I

to address their needs.

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, our analyses suggest that VOI/TIS may not be having a
major impact to date on prison management issues and privatization.
Longer term historical trends have been impacting prison management over
the past decade. The use of privatization has been very modest under
VOI/TIS and may be related more to political than to administrative
correctional decisions.
Although our analyses did not reveal large impacts on prison
management at the national level, it is possible to provide more precise
information on several prison management topics at the 'individualstate
level. For example, by examining differences in offender participation
in programming, inmate grievances, as well as assaults in states where
porti.ons of similar inmates are sentenceid under TIS and non-TIS laws, we
may be able to obtain a clearer impact of such policies.

Such analyses

have been conducted in North Carolina (Memory et al. 1999) and currently
being investigated by RAND using data from Washington State.
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I.

BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTIONS

Across the nation, states are joining the growing movement to "get
/I

tough1#on crime and criminals. Three-strikes, mandatory minimums, and
Truth-in-Sentencing legislation are all attempts to keep serious
offenders in prison for longer periods of time and promote public
safety.

Most generally, Truth-in-Sentencing refers to the requirement

that offenders serve a substantial portion of their imposed prison
sentence.

This is in contrast to correctional policies that allow for

release of offenders before they have served their full court-imposed
sentence.

Truth-in-Sentencing laws are intended to both deter offenders

from committing crime and help restore the credibility of the criminal
justice system in the eyes of the public.
The Federal government recently launched an effort to encourage
states to adopt Truth-in-Sentencing and other forms of "get tough1#
legislation. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
as amended, provided for Federal violent-Offender Incarceration and
Truth-in-Sentencing (VOI/TIS) grants to the states. This legislation
was largely designed to increase the capacity of state correctional
systems to confine serious and violent offenders for longer periods of
time and to assure the public that these offenders would serve a
substantial portion of their sentences (OJP 1996).

Specifically, the

purposes of the VOI/TIS incentive grants are to provide states with
funds to:

0

Build or expand bed capacity in correctional facilities.for
confinement of offenders convicted of a Part 1 violent crimes

Much of the information provided .in this chapter is taken from
the national evaluation of VOI/TIS conducted by RAND (Turner et al.
2001).
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or juveniles adjudicated for acts which, if committed by an
adult, would constitute a Part 1 violent crime6
0

Build or expand temporary or permanent correctional facilities,
/I

including facilities on military bases, prison barges, and boot
camps, to house convicted nonviolent offenders and criminal
aliens, for the purpose of freeing up existing prison space for
offenders convicted of Part 1 violent crime
0

Build or expand local jail capacity7

The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, as amended,
authorized over $10 billion in Subtitle A funds for the years 1995 to
2000.

These funds were to be divided equally between two programs:

Truth-in-Sentencing (TIS) Incentive Grants and Violent-Offender
Incarceration (VOI) Grants.

States could apply for and receive funding

through either or both of these programs.

ALLOCATION OF VOI/TIS FUNDS

Between fiscal years 1996 and 1999, nearly two billion dollars
were awarded to states under the VOI/TIS incentive grants program, with
$927 million allocated under TIS and $920 million under VOI.

Thirty

states and the District of Columbia received TIS funding in at least one
of these years. Not surprisingly, the largest total funding amounts
under the VOI/TIS program have gone to the most populous states because
the TIS funds disbursed are proportional to the total number of violent
crimes. California has received the most funds to date--$289 million;
New York and Florida have received over $150 million each.

Eleven less

populated states--Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, New

Part 1 violent crimes are defined by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation as murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, rape, robbery,
and aggravated assault (FBI 2000).
CPO 1999 Application Kit, p. 2.

’
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Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, West Virginia, and
I

Wyoming--received less than $10 million each.

RAND recently completed a national evaluation of the
implementation and early outcome experiences of the VOI/TIS incentive
grant program (see Turner et at. 2001). The current study was designed
to complement the national evaluation, examining adaptations in prison
management made by state correctional agencies in response to VOI/TIS.
Specifically, the current study addresses the following research
questions:

0

What management changes have been made by state correctional
agencies in order to deal with the increase in the numbers of
violent offenders being incarcerated, many for much longer
periods than in the past?

0

What additional safety and training procedures have been
instituted for correctional sta,ff in order to deal with the
violent offenders?

0

How does the increase in violent offenders affect the type and
extent of programming (e.g., education, prison employment)
health care and safety procedures?

0

What types of offenders, programs, or services fall within
private corrections? What has been the experience of private
corrections in terms of inmate and officer safety, infractions,
accountability and costs?

The current study answers these questions using a three-tiered
methodology. Nationwide characteristics on prison management were
gathered for all states; case studies on prison management were
conducted for seven states (California, Florida, New York, North
Carolina, Oregon, Texas, and Washington).

Detailed case studies on

issues related to privatization that included site visits, were
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conducted in three of the seven states--Texas,North Carolina, and
Florida.
We turn first to a review and discussion of prison management in
/ I

Chapter 11.

Chapter I11 follows with a similar presentation for

privatization. In Chapter IV, we discuss the potential impacts of
VOI/TIS on prison management and privatization. Chapter V presents an
overview of the research methodology. In Chapter VI, we present
findings from our analysis of national trends; Chapter VI1 presents
management findings from the seven case studies; in Chapter VIII, the
three-state case study findings for privatization. Chapter IX presents
the summary and conclusions.
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11.

REVIEW OF PRISON MANAGEMENT

,

At the aggregate level, VOI/TIS and related policies are likely to
produce changes in the composition of correctional populations and alter
management strategies and programs for incarcerated populations.
Potential changes produced by VOI/TIS and other "get tough" sentencing
policies notwithstanding, correctional management pas long been
recognized as a challenging task.

In addition to the general issues

surrounding management of any large organization, correctional
administrators face many unique responsibilities associated with the
competing demands of incarceration.
One of those responsibilities is to establish and maintain an
organization consistent with the purpose of incarceration. This purpose
determines the "services" to be delivered (or goals to be accomplished)
by correctional managers. At different points in Amelrican history, the
goal of incarceration has shifted in response to pressure from various
social and legal movements. For most of the 19OOs, the primary
correctional goal was the rehabilitation of inmates (Andrews et al.
1990). The rehabilitation perspective seeks to change individual
offenders in a way that prevents future criminality. As Martinson
(1974) described it, the rehabilitation perspective views criminal
behavior as a disease amenable to cure. Prisons were regarded as houses
of "correction" and the institutional environment was thought to promote
inmate remorse and reform.

Indeterminate sentencing and the possibility

for parole were thought to both encourage positive inmate behavior
within the institution and allow prison officials the necessary
flexibility to monitor the rehabilitative progress of individual
inmates
By the early to mid-1970s a number of influences, including the

concerns raised by the Civil Rights and other social movements about
discrimination by criminal justice officials, lead to criticism of the
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Irehabilitation-oriented approach of correctional systems (Feely and
Simon 1992).

Reformers became concerned about the broad discretion

authorities were afforded in managing inmate populations under an
/ I

indeterminate sentencing structure. In addition, a high-profile review
of available evidence on the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs
called into question the efficacy of these programs (Martinson 1974),
leading to the widespread sentiment that. "nothing workst1(see Gendreau
and Ross 1987).
These pressures contributed to a substantial change in the
paradigm dominating corrections over the past twenty-five years.
Correctional and sentencing policy shifted from a central focus on
processing of individual cases to a concern with the standardization of
sanctioning for all offenders (Feely and Simon 1992; Tonry and Hatlestad
1997).

Crime control policy has become highly politicized--leading to

an increasing emphasis on incarceration as the primary response to both
violent and nonviolent criminal behavior- (Blumstein 1995).

Since 1980,

all 50 states and the federal government. have established mandatory
minimum terms of imprisonment for conviction of various types of crimes
that might have otherwise resulted in a non-prison sentence or shorter
term of incarceration (Tonry 1996).

Data from the Bureau of Justice

Statistics show that between 1980 and 15199, the number of state and
federal prisoners grew from 329,821 to 3,344,369 (Beck 2000; Beck and
Gilliard 1995).

During the same time period, the incarceration rate

(number of prisoners per 100,000 population) went from 9 to 20 for the
federal population and 130 to 272 for state populations (Beck 2000; Beck
and Gilliard 1995).
Rather than an increase in offending activity, researchers have
identified !'get tough" sanctioning policies as the primary explanation
for this sizable increase in incarceration (Cohen and Canela-Cacho
1994).

In particular, policies related to sentencing for drug offenses

have played a substantial role in the dramatic increase in imprisonment.
Lengthy mandatory minimum prison sentences have become primary
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ammunition of the Itwaron drugs," drawing large numbers of first-time
offenders and low level drug dealers into prison populations at an
unprecedented rate (Tonry 1995).

The Bureau of Justice Statistics

reports that between 1990 and 1998 drug offenders accounted for 19
percent of the growth of sentenced state prisoners.

Half of the total

growth, however, was attributed to prisoners sentenced for violent
crimes (Beck 2000).
The increased use of incarceration means that correctional
officials today must manage growing populations of inmates serving
longer terms of incarceration. Prison administrators have been forced
to focus increased attention on issues of cost control and the
distribution of scarce resources, including living space, programming,
and supervision by correctional officers (Feely and Simon 1992).

The

pressure on administrators to adapt to these constraints occurs within
an organizational context already recognized for presenting unique
challenges to management.

Correctional institutions are facilities

peopled by unwilling short- and very long-term residents who must be
housed, fed, clothed, protected, monitored, and disciplined for
disruptive and sometimes violent behavior. Under conditions where
inmates often substantially outnumber staff, prison administrators
require effective methods for maintaining order and control while
protecting the Constitutional rights of inmates and safety of employees
(Wright 1994).

The increased reliance on incarceration can reasonably

be expected to complicate this already difficult management situation.
In the next sections, we discuss a number of correctional management
issues in the context of prison population and policy changes, including
good/gain time and parole, classification, health care, programming,
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cost of corrections, professionalism of correctional employees, and
crowding in correctional facilities.8

EARLY RELEASE

Two tools traditionally available to correctional administrators
to assist in managing the complicated issues of inmate populations are
behavioral incentives known as lpgood
time” and parole. Good time, also
called gain time, refers to credits inmates earn toward a sentence
reduction in exchange for good behavior within the institution, Good
behavior consists of following the rules of conduct, but may also
include participation in rehabilitative and other programming (Weisburd
and Chayet 1996). In the United States,,good time laws were adopted
largely for the purpose of encouraging positive behavior (without the
use of corporal punishment or solitary confinement), active
participation in prison employment, and serving as an internal mechanism
for relieving overcrowding (Parisi and Zillo 1983).
Similarly, parole is thought to encourage positive, productive
inmate behavior within correctional institutions. It was established as
an important part of the rehabilitation model. Under parole systems,
inmates who could demonstrate their rehabilitation and readiness for
life in the community were eligible €or early release, at the discretion
of a board of respected citizens and professionals. Like good time,
parolle was intended to serve as a source of motivation for behavioral
compliance and productivity but also provided a mechanism for relieving
overcrowded conditions (Rhine 1996).

O v e r the past decade or more, a

distinctly negative conception of parole has developed among politicians
and the public, encouraged by several highly publicized crimes committed

* This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of all important
correctional management issues. For example, judicial intervention in
correctional facilities has produced sometimes quite radical change in
the requirements placed on prison managers (Smith 2000). Discussion and
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by parolees.

I

I

This negative conception lead to what Petersilia (1999:
I

479) refers to as "the most profound" o f the criminal justice reforms
undertaken in recent years.

In her review of parole and prison reentry

in the United States, Petersilia (1999) reports that presently only 15
states maintain traditional parole boards with full discretionary
release authority. By 1998, 14 states had abolished parole and 21 had
reduced the scope of authority of parole boards.

CLASSIFICATION

Another tool used by correctional officials to assist in
accomplishing the complicated management task is inmate classification.
Early forms of inmate classification consisted of the simple physical
separation of women from men, juveniles from adults, and mentally ill
inmates from others. These broad separations were performed largely for
the protection of one category of inmate from another (Craddock 1993).
Over the past century, classification schemes have become much more
complex, expanded the number of factors employed in grouping decisions,
and diversified in the types of inmate groups identified (Solomon and
Camp 1993).
The most prominent forms of classification are intended to
separate inmates into groups according to security risk, such as the
threat of escape from the facility, and custody requirements keferring
to the level of danger posed by inmates to themselves, staff, and fellow
inmates. This sorting assists prison managers in more effectively using
available resources by placing more dangerous inmates under higher (and
more expensive) levels of security and custody than less dangerous
inmates (Craddock 1993).

In addition, inmate classification has been

used for other purposes including rehabilitative and medical need,
identification of vulnerable inmates who require protection, and

examination of judicial intervention in correctional systems, is complex
and beyond the scope of this report.
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managing disciplinary problems (Fernandez and Neiman 1998).
Classification has become such an important mechanism for the protection
and control of inmates that successful law suits have been brought
against prison officials for failing to employ or properly use this
management tool (Vaughn and del Carmen 1995).

CROWDING

Since the days of Philadelphia's Walnut Street Jail two centuries
ago, American correctional administrators have faced the persistent
problem of managing facilities crowded with too many inmates (Mullen
1985).9

Despite the seemingly obvious nature of the problem, there is

no consistent method of determining how many inmates a facility can hold
(Beck 2000). In fact, in its survey of correctional facilities the
Bureau of Justice Statistics asks states to report facility capacity in
three different ways in an effort to capture the major methods (Beck
2000).

These methods are referred to as design, rated, and operational

capacity. Design capacity is the number of inmates the facility was
intended to house by those who planned l[or designed) the construction of
the prison. Rated capacity refers to the number of inmates that
facilities can hold as determined by designated officials within
individual states. Operational capacity represents the number of
inmates facilities can hold based upon t.he current availability of
staff, programming, and services (Beck ;?OOO).

Among the other methods

for determining capacity are spatial density (amount of square feet of
confinement space per inmate), social density (availability of privacy
in living spaces), and mobility (amount of time inmates are locked in
their cells) (Mullen 1985).

Of course, crowded prisons and jails are far from an exclusively
American concern. To varying degrees, many other countries experience
this problem in their correctional systems (see Tonry and Hatlestad
1997).
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is det rmined, wh n the number of inmates
I

exhausts available prison space and/or other resources, crowding becomes
a problem for correctional facilities. Some concerns about crowding
expressed by correctional officials relate to safety and security risks,
reduced access to medical care, programming, and recreational
opportunities, understaffing and higher levels of staff turnover,
increased law suits citing conditions of confinement, and general
I

deterioration of control over the prison population (Riveland 1999).
Among these concerns, threats to safety and security posed by crowding
have perhaps drawn the most attention. It is a reasonable and quite
common assertion that overcrowding leads to increased levels of
violence.

While there is some support for this assertion (Harer and

Steffensmeier 1996; Gaes and McGuire 1985), the available research
evidence on this hypothesis is mixed (Useem and Reisig 1999; Gaes 1994).
Some conclude that the level of crowding alone may not have a direct
impact on violence but may be depend on other factors, such as
individual perceptions (Wooldredge 1997) and management strategies
(Ruback and Carr 1993).

Others have called attention to the potential

for increased gang presence (Harer and Steffensmeier 1996; Pelz 1996)
and racial tensions (Henderson, Cullen, Carroll, and Feinberg 2000) to
contribute to volatile conditions in crowded correctional facilities.
Concerns about crowded conditions are not restricted to potential
impact on inmates, but also relate to the impact on staff. Crowding may
exacerbate job stress that has long been recognized as particularly high
among correctional employees (Wright, Saylor, Gilman, and Camp 1997).
Stress among such employees is associated with staff turnover, which is
also disproportionately high for corrections relative to other
professions (Finn 2000; Mitchell, MacKenzie, Styve, Gover 2000).

Staff

turnover is costly and may add additional strain on the remaining
workforce.
Recently, a trend in correctional management has sought to reduce
the stress of correctional workers (among other goals) by decentralizing

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view
expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

- 12

-

I

I

'

the decision making power within the organizations. In contrast, the
I

I

classical, or control model of prison management represents a style that
maintains a bureaucratic and highly centralized administration (DiIulio
1987).

Institutions operating under control model-type leadership

utilize a paramilitary organizational structure and reqpire strict
adherence to rules and procedures. Little discretion is allocated to

/

,

non-managerial staff. Paralleling developments in non-prison
organizations, the new approach affords correctional line staff more
discretion in the performance of their duties and application of policy,
,
and provides opportunities for input into the operatian of the facility.
This decentralized management styles have been referred to as the
Employee Investment Model (Stohr, Lovrich, Menke, and Zupan 1994),
Participatory Management (Wright et al. 19971, Total Qbality Management
(Franklin, Platt, Wheatley, and Bohac 19971, and Strategic Management
(Fleisher 1998).

This approach is associated with an increase in

professionalism among correctional workers, including an emphasis on
education and training of line staff. Researchers assessing the impact
of decentralized management styles, relative to more centralized styles,
have found them to be associated with higher levels job satisfaction for
line staff (Stohr et al. 1994; Wright et al. 1997) and supervisors
(Reisig and Lovrich 19981, lower rates of disorder within facilities
(Reisig 19981, and lower rates of work-related stress (Stohr et al.
1994).

HEALTH CARE

The U.S. Supreme Court has identified adequate medical care as a
right., rather than a privilege for all inmates in correctional
faci1,ities (Estelle v. G a m b l e 1976).

This requirement has called

attention to the major concern that health care can be for
administrators. Prisoners are largely drawn from low-income populations
with limited access to medical care. Unhealthful habits prior to
incarceration; such as poor diet, drug use, and risky sexual behaviors,
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make correctional inmates a medically needy population (Marquart,
Merianos, Herbert, and Carroll 1997). Moreover, as inmates age their
general health condition worsens, requiring more care and physical
accommodation than inmates at younger ages (Maruschak and Beck 2001;
Neeley, Addison, and Craig-Moreland 199'7).

In fact, older inmates with

special needs present such unique challenges that some jurisdictions
have opened specialized assisted-living facilities, such as Washington's
Ahtamun View Correctional Complex, to provide care for elderly and
disabled inmates (Potterfield 1999).

Even while housed with the general

population, responding to the needs of aging inmates is expensive.

The

costs associated with the care of older inmates are expected to grow as
more inmates serve longer terms of incarceration under "get tough"
sentencing policies (McDonald 1999; Blurnstein 1995).

In an assessment

of the federal system, the General Accounting Office (2000) identifies
medical needs of older inmates as contributing to an average annual
increase of 8.6 percent in health care costs over the 1990s.
In addition to aging inmates, a major health-related concern in
correctional facilities is serious illnesses such as tuberculosis and
HIV/AIDS. Because of their life circumstances, inmates are generally
drawn from populations with a relatively high rate of these illnesses
(Hammett, Harmon, and Maruschak 1999; Vlahov 1990). Once inside
correctional facilities, high risk behaviors and close contact between
inmates in crowded facilities can produce conditions conducive to spread
of infectious diseases (National Commission on AIDS 1991).

According to

Bureau of Justice Statistics, at the close of 1997 22,338 state
prisoners were infected with the HIV virus.

During that year, 538 of

2,872 inmate deaths (19 percent) were attributable to AIDS (Maruschak

1999).

In a survey conducted by that National Institute of Justice and

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, inmates with tuberculosis
infection in responding state and federal facilities numbered 15,033 in
1997 (Hammett et al. 1999).

In a recent report sponsored by the

National Institute of Justice, the Centers for Disease Control and
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Prevention, and the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the researchers
I

conclude that there have been substantial improvements in the control
and treatment diseases such as tuberculosis and H I V / A I D S in U.S.
correctional facilities but they remain considerable health care concern
for administrators (Hammett et al. 1999).

PROGRAMMING

Although public opinion is regular.Ly portrayed as punitive toward
convicted offenders, researchers have found that Americans continue to
view rehabilitation as an important function of corrections (Applegate,
Cullen, and Fisher 1997).

Despite the "get tough" trend evident in

corrections over the past twenty years, there remains within
jurisdictions varying degrees of interest in rehabilitation (Tonry,
September 1999). Most correctional facilities operate at least some
rehabilitative programs, available to at: least some members of the
inmate population. Such treatment programs may target special
populations, such as programs for sex offenders, substance abusers, or
those with mental health problems. These programs are largely intended
to reduce recidivism and generally improve inmates' chances of success
in the community upon release. Rehabilitative programs may also serve
other goals, such as reducing idleness and identifying inmates (through
voluntary program participation and completion) who maybe a lower risk
for behavioral problems or future offending relative to non-volunteers
and dropouts (MacKenzie 1997).
Since the mid-1970s and the publication of Martinson's work
(1974:),rehabilitative programming was discounted by many as largely
ineffective. However, a number of researchers have continued to assess
the performance of treatment program in producing behavioral change in
participants. At the start of this century, a growing number of
reviewers conclude that correctional tre<atmentprograms may in fact
reduce recidivism, at least for certain types of offenders under some
conditions (e.9. Andrews, Zinger, Hoge, N3onta, Gendreau, and Cullen
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1990; MacKenzie 1997; MacKenzie and Hickman 1998; Gaes, Flanagan,
I

Motiuk, and Stewart 1999).

These positive findings provide renewed

incentive for prisons to establish and inaintain inmate access to
appropriate treatment programs within correctional facilities. However,
the Severe limitation placed on resources such as space and funding
presented by the ever growing inmate population make providing adequate
levels of programming a considerable challenge for prison managers
I

(Riveland 1999).

COST OF CORRECTIONS

However appropriate and necessary :In individual cases,
incarceration is an expensive response to crime.1° Consequently, one of
the most obvious impacts of the dramatic increase in the use of
incarceration over the past twenty years has been the growing cost of
corrections. Between 1980 and 1994, total capital expenses (costs
associated with building, renovating, and acquiring land for prisons)
for federal and state governments rose from $538 million to $2.3 billion
(General Accounting Office 1996).

Construction of prisons and jails is

only part of the cost of incarceration. Day-to-day operation of prisons
and jails can far exceed the original costs of construction. According
to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in 1996 (the most recent year for
which data are available) states spent 94 percent of their prison
dollars on operating facilities, with the remaining 6 percent going to
capital expenses (Stephan 1999).

In a number of jurisdictions, the

share of state budgets allocated to corrections has grown in an effort
to keep pace with the need to build and (operateprisons for a record
number of inmates.
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One tool available to correctional agencies to assist in reducing
at least some cost is to engage inmates in prison industry programs and
upkeep of facilities, such as laundry and janitorial duties.

In

addition to the potential for offsetting at least some cost, inmate work
programs and activity reduce inmate idleness and may produce
rehabilitative affects under some conditions (Bouffard, MacKenzie, and
Hickman 2000).

10 In this report, the term "costly" refers strictly to
out-of-pocket expense directly related to incarcerating inmates and does
not refer to the cost effectiveness of incarceration relative to other
interventions. While the latter issue is important and has been the
focus considerable empirical attention (see Zimring and Hawkins 1 9 9 5 ) ~
examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this report.
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111.

REVIEW OF PRIVATIZATION

I

I

I

Many commentators have remarked that prison privatization is
nothing new in the U.S., with roots running back to the "convict-lease"
system of the Reconstruction era. At that time, privatC entrepreneurs
leased prisoners to replace slaves that had previously provided labor
for road gangs, forestry and mining crews, agricultural plantations, and
manufacturing workshops. Private entrepreneurship entered the field of
adult corrections again in the early 1980s, as neo-liberal ideas of
deregulation and privatization interested reformers intent on reducing
the size of "big government." Private corporations would relieve
government of the burdens of prison management, charging a per diem fee
for each prisoner transferred to private confinement. By introducing
innovative management techniques and reducing bureaucracy, proponents of
privatization promised that private firms would build facilities faster
and cheaper, and operate them at less expense, while delivering higher
quality correctional services.
In 1983, the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) was formed.
CCA soon began to flourish, eventually becoming the largest private
prison company in the world.

The Wackenhut Corporation established a

private prison division the following year. CCA and Wackenhut dominate
the field, sharing 75 percent of the market between them.ll No other
company exceeds 9 percent of market share. The private prison industry
is currently confining approximately 80,000 state and federal prisoners
under direct contracts or through intergovernmental agreements.
Despite this sizeable inmate population, a string of operational
problems, spotlighted by the national media attention, have plagued the
two industry leaders. In July 1998, six prisoners escaped from a CCA
facility in Youngstown, Ohio.

It later came to light that there had
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already been 20 stabbings and two homicides at the facility in little
I

more than a year of operations. An investigation performed for the U . S .
Department of Justice reveals that many operational failings had
contributed to these events. For example, the classification system
failed to screen out maximum security prisoners in what was intended to
be a medium security prison. Medical treatment and other programs were
inadequate. Also, the prison was operated with a largely inexperienced
I

staff (Office of the Corrections Trustee 1998).
Wackenhut has also experienced problems. From December 1996
through August 1999, there were four pritsoner homicides in two Wackenhut
prisons in New Mexico and a guard was kJ.lledduring a riot. During that
period, the prisoner homicide rate in the two Wackenhut prisons was one
for every 400 prisoners, compared to the average national prison
homicide rate in 1998 of one homicide for every

22,000

prisoners.

Investigators found indications that Wackenhut had not been meeting
,
acceptable standards for classification of prisoners, staffing, program
services, or security procedures.

Two Wackenhut contracts have since been terminated when more
problems surfaced. Operation of the Travis County State Jail was taken
over by the state after a dozen Wackenhuit staff were investigated for
alleged sexual misconduct.

In Jena, Louisiana, a Wackenhut facility for

juvenile offenders was closed after a judge found evidence of human
rights abuses and brutality. Reports detailing the problems in these
private prisons cited inadequacies in staffing and program operations.
In the wake of these highly publicized events, the industry has
suffered in the financial markets.

From 1995 through 1997, CCA had

ranked among the top five performing companies on the New York Stock
Exchange.

In the summer of 1997, CCA stock traded at $45 a share.

In

mid-December 2000, the stockls value was just 19 cents a share.

Wackenhut spun off its prison subsidiary in 1988. The company
went public in 1994, and is now formally known as l'WCC.'l The Wackenhut
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Wackenhut also experienced a decline. .Afterthe death of the guard in
New Mexico, its stock price dropped 28 percent over two days.
Debate about the causes and remedies for the problems of private
prisons has been heated. Opponents of prison privatization maintain
that their fears about privatization have been realized--that a profit
orientation in as complex and risky business such as prison operation
would result in disaster.
While conceding that some facilities have failed to offer safe,
humane conditions of confinement, corporate executives have
characterized these as exceptional cases in an otherwise successful
industry. They charge that the private prison sector is held to a much
higher standard than public corrections, and that the media unfairly
exposes problems in private facilities that go unnoticed in the public
sector.
TO date, the body of research literature fails to offer much

credible evidence to inform this debate. Few areas of correctional
research have been more contentious. Despite the interest in topic of
privatization, there are relatively few studies and many of these are
lacking rigorous methodology. For example, no study of the quality of
prison services has involved random assignment of prisoners.

Studies

focusing on the costs of private prisons'relative to public prisons
often fail to examine comparable services or facilities, i.e., they
compare "apples to oranges."

Finally, there are questions whether

findings of various studies can be generalized across time and
jurisdiction.

RESEARCH ON COST COMPARISONS

Research findings on costs and savings of private prisons versus
public prisons have been generally inconsistent and contradictory. Some
find that privatization can reduce operational costs by 10 to 15 percent

Corporation continues to hold a 56 percent share of sWCCti stock.
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In a review of the literature, however, a team of

researchers led by Douglas McDonald concluded that "the few existing
studies and other available data do not provide strong evidence of any
general pattern" of cost-savings '[McDonald et al. 1998, p. v).

In

another synthesis of the literature, Pratt and Maahs conducted a
meta-analysis of

24

cost studies. They found that the best predictors

of prison per diem costs were facility-related factors, such as size,
age, and security level. They concluded that private prisons are not
more cost-effective than public prisons (Pratt and Maahs 1999).
There are limitations to this bod{ of research that complicate
interpretation of findings. Most studies neglect to take account of
additional costs that may be incurred on top of contracted per diem
charges. None have adequately traced costs over time to understand how
expenditure patterns may shift. In addation, some of the cost savings
reported might be artifacts of the methods used to allocate government
overhead costs rather than actually savings.
Most studies have failed to account for aspects of public and
private prison operations that may render them not truly comparable,
including facility design and prison population characteristics. Other
differences are that private prison per diem fees may be maintained a
lower level when private contractors negotiate a cap on the medical
costs per inmate. Thus, inmates requiring more expensive medical care
are placed within or transferred to public rather than private
facilities.

Privatization may produce savings by cutting costs for

health services, staff compensation, and by lowering personnel staffing
ratios (Nelson 1998).

Employee compensation and staffing ratios tend to

increase over time, however, as labor market demands become more
intense, and as investigation of operational problems and civil rights
litigation force changes in programs and policies that affect
operational costs.
If cost-savings are possible through privatization, the extent of
these savings is likely to vary considerably depending upon the public
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correctional system that serves as a comparison. For example, the
potential for savings associated with privatization is reduced when
compared to a public corrections system that incorporates the
fundamentals of cost-effective management, such as efficient facility
design, prudent staffing ratios, comprehensive management information
systems, streamlined procurement, medical cost controls, and trim
administrative operations.

COMPARISON OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES

Cost savings represent only one side of the privatization ledger;
the quality of correctional service provided is another point on which
the performance of public prisons has been compared to private prisons.
Little is known about the quality of pra-vateprisons because most
studies have focused primarily or exclusively on cost issues. Of the
existing studies, most are of limited value because they compare
services and programs delivered to dissimilar correctional populations,
using non-random comparison groups (GAO 1996; McDonald et. al. 1998).
The Urban Institute (1989) compared the quality of services in
three pairs of institutions (one pair housing adults and two pairs
housing juveniles). Their findings from adult private and public
prisons in Kentucky favored the private facility. The public facility
housed a more difficult population, however, and the study has been
criticized for lacking a sound theoretical model for specification of
appropriate performance measures (Gaes et al. 1998: 4).
Charles Logan (1993) supplied a taxonomy for measuring performance
of prison operations. His "confinement inodel" identifies eight key
elements for assessment: security, safety, order, care, activity,
justice, conditions, and management.

Some however have criticized

Logan's model for omitting the elements of education and treatment
services. In a comparative study of quality in three women's prisons
(one private, one state and one federal prison), Logan analyzed data

from operational records and staff and inmate interviews. While staff
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,interviewdata favored the private prison, the inmate surveys favored
the public prison on all but one measure (activity). Logan nonetheless
concluded that the private prison was more effective on six of his eight
/I

dimensions.

The state public prison scored higher on the care element

and was not different from the private and federal women's prisons on
the dimension of justice.12
Logants findings have been criticized for over-reliance on staff
survey responses, since private prison staff might offer biased
responses given that their prospects for continued employment could be
at stake.

Critics have also charged that he lacked experience and

objectivity in the interpretation of several performance measures (Gaes,
Camp, and Saylor 1998).
In more recent evaluations, researchers have attempted to overcome
the @'applesand orangesttproblem. A legislative study in Tennessee
compared a private prison with two public facilities that were built at
nearly the same time, with similar architecture.

The research team

concluded that the facilities were roughly equivalent on a number of
service performance, including safety, personnel, facility conditions,
health care, and inmate activities (Tennessee Legislative Select
Oversight Committee 1995).
Archambeault and Deis (1996) compared two private prisons with a
public prison in Louisiana that were constructed on similar architecture
and opened around the same time.

Data were analyzed on a number of

performance indicators such as escapes, assaults, sexual misconduct,
disturbances, deaths, disciplinary actions, grievances, drug tests,
communicable diseases, participation in education and vocational
training, attainment of General Education Diplomas, and medical care.

l2 Logan collected data from a public prison in New Mexico and the
private prison that succeeded it in the same state (studying essentially
the same female population before and after they were transferred from
the public facility to the private facility). He added a third
comparison with the federal prison for women at Alderson, West Virginia
(Logan 1993).
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The researchers concluded that the private facilities
out-performed the public prison on most measures. The research,
however, has received criticism on various methodological issues, e.g.,
/I

reanalysis of raw serious misconduct data indicated that the comparative
rates of serious misconduct were much less favorable to the private
prisons (Gaes, Camp and Saylor 1998).
The Washington State Legislative Budget Committee (1996) assessed
the feasibility of prison privatization by looking at costs and
performance at the same facilities evalu.ated in Tennessee and Louisiana.
The Committee's findings were consistent with the conclusions of
Tennessee researchers, but differed with. those of the researchers in
Louisiana. They concluded that the quality of prison services and
performance was generally similar in the private and public facilities.
In Arizona, Thomas conducted a study comparing the operational
performance of a private, minimum security "treatment facility!! with the
average scores of 15 state-operated facilities (Thomas 1997).

He

concl.uded that the private facility was superior to this average in such
dimensions as public safety, risk of injury or death for staff and
inmates, and compliance with professional standards.

He found, however,

that Ilone or more individual state-operated prisons had performance
records that were equivalent or superiorttto the private facility. For
example, across at least one critical program dimension--monthly
educational program enrollment--five pub:Lic prisons had monthly
enrollment rates that were much higher than had been attained in the
private prison.
Researchers from the University of Minnesota conducted a
comparison of public and private prison services in that state.

The

study relied primarily on data from structured interviews of matched
sets of medium-security inmates.

On most: dimensions of prison

operations (prison safety and security; availability, quality, and
intensity of education and treatment programs; and staff qualifications
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and experience) prisoners gave the public prisons significantly higher
ratings.
Data drawn from state agency records supported prisoners'
perceptions that security staff were less experienced at the private
prison.

The staff turnover rate at the private facility was more than

three times higher than at the public prisons.

Prisoners housed at the

private prison gave significantly lower ratings to prison educational
programs than did their counterparts in Minnesota's public prisons, who
attained General Education Diplomas at a 35 percent higher rate (Greene
2000).

Only one study has attempted to assess comparative performance of
private and public prisons in terms of recidivism. Using a quasiexperimental design involving matched comparison groups, Lanza-Kaduce
and Parker (1998) compared recidivism rates (defined as new criminal
offenses) of inmates released from pub1i.c and private prisons in
Florida.

They found that private prison releasees had a lower rate of

recidivism than released public prisoners.

Further, new offenses

committed by private prison releasees were found to be less serious than
those committed by public prison releasees.
The findings of the Lanza-Kaduce and Parker study have been
questioned because of concerns that the public and private prison
populations were not comparable, the sampling techniques were flawed,
and that there were discrepancies in how recidivism was measured
(Florida Department of Corrections 1998).
One of the difficulties faced by researchers in assessing private
prisons is the lack of quality data. In partial response to this need,
the U.S. Department of Justice sponsored a national survey of private
prisons, conducted by Austin.

The survey produced data that allowed for

comparisons with survey data from public prisons on a range of issues.
Sixty-five private prisons participated in the survey, providing data
that described both prisoner and facility characteristics, programs
offered, staffing levels, and prisoner misconduct.
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Austin found relatively few significant differences between
private and public operation of prisons.

Program participation rates

were higher at private prisons, though staff-to-prisoner ratios were 15
percent lower. Levels of violence'in private prisons were substantially
higher, i.e., there were 49 percent more assaults on staff, and 65
percent more prisoner-on-prisonerassaults (Austin and Coventry 1999).
Overall, Austin concluded that in most respects (custody levels,
personnel, types of programs) the private prisoners were similar to
public prisons, with a modest reduction in labor costs for private
prisons.

SUMMARY

Overall, the body of available research on the costs and quality
of private prisons relative to public prisons can lend no solid support
I

to any conclusions. To date, very little research has been conducted.
The existing research has yet to overcome a number of difficult
methodological issues, such as constructing defensible comparison groups
and establishing a means for comparing actual costs associated with
private and public prisons.

However, available research suggests

potential problems that accompany privatization. More high quality
research is necessary to provide more co.nclusive answers.
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IV.

POTENTIAL IMPACT OF VOIJTIS ON PRISON MANAGEMENT AND PRIVATIZATION

The purpose of VOI/TIS funds is to incarcerate more violent
/I

offenders for longer periods of time. Changes produced by VOI/TIS occur
within the context of the Itgettough" movement that has produced
numerous similar changes in sentencing and corrections policy.

Within a

correctional system already strapped for resources to manage an
expanding incarcerated population, it is reasonable to expect that
further expansion is likely to exacerbate the existing challenges facing
correctional administrators. Below we discuss potential impacts of
VOI/TIS changes on several major issues of concern for prison
operations.

EARLY RELEASE

Both the VOI and T I S grants are incentives for states to reduce

I

opportunities for early release of violent offenders. T I S grants
require states to ensure that violent offenders serve at least 85
percent of their sentence and VOI grants require lengthy sentences
(along with other stiffening of penalties).13 Correctional
administrators have long regarded early release as an important tool to
motivate compliant behavior (Proctor and Pease 2000; Parisi and Zillo
1983).

It is possible that the removal of such opportunities may

complicate the task of maintaining an orderly prison environment.

In a

recent study, Memory and colleagues found evidence in favor of this
hypothesis in North Carolina. The researchers examined the impact of a
transition from a sentencing structure allowing good time and parole
eligibility to a structure removing these early release mechanisms.
Among those inmates not eligible for early release, the researchers
found more, and more serious, disciplinary infractions than among
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inmates whose behavior might influence their release date (Memory, Guo,
Parker, and Sutton 1999).

Thus, implementation of VOI/TIS policies may

result in a reduction of compliant behavior within the correctional
population.

/I

Another potential outcome is that VOI/TIS policies may contribute
to further expansion of prison populations.

Early release and parole

have been regarded by some scholars as mechanisms for control of the
size of the correctional population (Blumstein and Cohen 1973).

The

stability of the prison population for most of last century, despite
demographic shifts and major historical events (such as the Great
Depression, several wars, and periods social unrest), has been
attributed to policies allowing correctional administrators to control
the t:iming of release (Blumstein 1995).

With the advent of the "get

tough" movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s, this authority was
reduced or eliminated in many states. This restriction of early release
authority has contributed to the dramatic growth in the prison
populations (Blumstein and Beck 1999).

A further reduction of release

authority under VOI/TIS and other "get tough" policies can be expected
to produce more of the same, in terms of prison population growth.

CLASSIFICATION

Another potential impact of VOI/TIS policies on prison management
is in the area of inmate classification.

In determining initial custody

level, most states rely on objective classification schemes that take
into account factors associated with potential risk (Austin 1993).

One

important factor associated with higher risk under these schemes is
severity of the crime of conviction (Austin 1993).

Consequently,

inmates sentenced to prison for violent crimes are likely to be assigned
to higher levels of custody than comparable non-violent inmates.

See Chapter I for a full description of the requirements for TIS
and VOI incentive grants.
l3
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Classification systems in some states also include the length of
sentence as a factor in classification, i.e., longer sentences are
associated with higher classification (Fernandez and Neiman 1998).

TO

the extent that VOI/TIS policies increase the number of violent
offenders in prisons and the length of time these offenders spend in
prison, it is reasonable to expect an increase in the number of inmates
classified at high custody levels. This is particularly likely as
violent offenders spend more time incarlzerated, thus reducing the rate
of turnover of available beds.

This issue may be of concern to states

because of the elevated costs associated with constructing and operating
higher custody prison environments relative to lower levels (Fernandez
and Neiman 1998; Solomon and Camp 1993)

In addition, correctional

systems may attempt to accommodate more violent offenders by increasing
release of lower level property offenders. This would serve to decrease
the share of low risk inmates in prisons. This may prove problematic,
in that these low risk inmates are frequently utilized for staff
positions within institutions that require mobility and independence,
such as office assistance or fire crew duty.

CROWDING

Perhaps the most frequent prediction about the impact of policies
intended to incarcerate more violent offenders for longer periods of
time and establish truth in sentencing is that they are likely to
exacerbate the crowded conditions that czlrrently exist in many
correctional facilities (e.g. MacKenzie 2000; Caplow and Simon 1999).
One explanation for how prison crowding might be produced is offered by
Wooldredge (1997).

In a study assessing the impact of state policies on

prisons, he describes an indirect relationship between prison crowding
and policies that limit early release discretion. Wooldredge finds that
such policies produce more long-term inmates.

In turn, a larger share

of long-term inmates reduces the rate of prison population turnover.
Thus, increasing numbers of long-term inmates contribute to prison
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crowding by holding prison beds out of circulation. VOI/TIS policies
1

are intended to create long-term inmates and therefore can reasonably be
expected to increase prison crowding.
Increased crowding conditions may have influences in other areas
of prison operation as well.

One concern about crowding is that it may

reduce safety for both staff and inmates. As discussed in the previous
chapter, at least some evidence links crowded conditions to violence
within prisons (Harer and Steffensmeier 1996; Gaes and McGuire 1985).
General misconduct rates may increase as a related manifestation of
crowding (Ruback and Carr 1993).

In addition, conditions of confinement

produced by crowding have given rise to many inmate grievances and law
suits (Gaes 1994).

An

exacerbation of these conditions related to

VOI/TIS can be expected to result in an increase in inmate initiation of
internal and external legal proceedings. Crowding may also negatively
impact staffing levels and turnover. To the extent that hiring of
I

correctional officers falls short of the rate of growth in the prison
population, the ratio of inmates to staff could be expected to increase.
This may lead to reduced inmate control and greater stress among a
workforce already characterized by high levels of job stress and
turnover (Finn 2000; Mitchell et al. 2000).

In sum, implementation of

VOI/TIS policies may have the affect of exacerbating crowded conditions
in correctional facilities which may, in turn, lead to higher rates of

I

assault on both staff and inmates, higher rates of general inmate
misconduct, increases in inmate filing of grievances and law suits, and
increases in inmate to staff ratio and staff turnover.

HEALTH CARE

To the extent that VOI/TIS policies increase terms of
incarceration and crowding within prisons, inmate health care may be
impacted. Gaes (1994) argues that the available research attempting to
link illness and correctional crowding is too methodologically weak to
support sound conclusions about the existence or nature of this link.
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Despite the lack of empirical evidence, it is reasonable to suspect more
I

sophisticated research may identify such a relationshtp. In the case of
communicable diseases, such as TB and H'IV, many suggest that closer
contact between inmates under crowded conditions may facilitate the
spread of illness (Hammett et al. 1999).

Others suggest that crowded

conditions may also make inmates more susceptible to such diseases due
to a stressful, generally unhealthful environment (Marquart et al.
1997).

Increases in sentence length may also impakt correctional health

care. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics' most recent inmate
survey, longer-term prisoners reported suffering more injuries and
illnesses than inmates incarcerated for a shorter period of time
(Maruschak and Beck 2001).
One possible consequence of longer sentences may be higher rates
of TR and HIV/AIDS.

Longer sentences may expose individual inmates to

these diseases over a longer time period!, thus providing more
opportunity for transmission. Thus, another potential''impact of VOI/TIS
policies may be an increase in TB and HIV/AIDS among the correctional
population. As discussed in a previous chapter, another health care
issue relates to aging inmates. VOI/TIS and other get tough policies
that lengthen sentences and restrict early release are likely to
increase the share of older inmates in the prison population.

This

group of inmates requires more medical care and accommodation than
younger inmates (Neeley et al. 1997).

It is reasonable to expect that

an increase in this segment of the prison population will place a
greater demand on health care serves and raise the overall cost of these
services as a result.

PROGRAMMING

Implementation of VOI/TIS policies may a l s o serve to reduce
participation of inmates in rehabilitative programming.

Early release

incentives have been considered by many correctional administrators as
effective in motivating inmates to voluntarily participate in
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In the absence of
I
early release incentives, inmates may be less inclined to willingly
rehabilitation programming (Parisi and Zillo 1983).

engage in rehabilitation programs.
be impacted in an indirect way.

Programming participation may also

Inmates without early release

incentives may engage in higher levels of non-compliant behavior (Memory
et al. 1999).

This may result in greater use of disciplinary techniques

i'

I

that isolate inmates from others or restrict their activities, including
participation in programming. Another :factor rela'ted to VOI/TIS and
other "get tough" policies that may decrease participation in
programming is increased crowding. Under crowded conditions, the
availability of rehabilitation programs for all inmates may be reduced
because programs are unable to increase their capacity to serve a
growing prison population. Moreover, under crowded conditions, space is
at a premium.

Areas previously used fox programming, such as gymnasiums

and classrooms, may be converted to living space to accommodate
additional inmates.

COST OF CORRECTIONS

While VOI/TIS is a program that provides states with money for
correctional systems, it is also likely to increase the cost of those
correctional systems. Correctional budgets are broadly categorized into
funds for building and equipping facilities (capital budget) and funds
for operation of facilities (operating budget).

The latter may be many

times larger than the former. For example, in 1999 the average capital
budget of the state and federal systems was approximately $78 million
and the average operating budget was roughly $580 million (Camp and Camp
1999).

VOI/TIS funds may increase state correctional costs because the

federal dollars may used to build capacity, but not to fund the much
more costly operation of prison facilities.

In fact, the General

Accounting Office (1998) identified cost as the leading reason why
states elected not to seek TIS federal funds.

In interviews with state

officials, 23 states were identified as lacking legislation that would
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ensure TIS eligibility. Officials in the majority of these states (16
of 23) reported that the federal funds were forfeited because of
concerns about increases in state expenses that would be not be offset
by TIS funds. Most of the management issues discussed above impact
prison operational cost. To the extent that VOI/TIS impacts these
issues, it is reasonable to expect operational costs to increase. For
example, a larger share of older inmates and higher rates of TB and

.

HIV/AIDS are likely to lead to increased health care costs (GAO 2000;
Hammett et al. 1999).

Operational costs are likely to be an increasing

burden on states implementing VOI/TIS policies as these correctional
systems experience the numerous related impacts of incarcerating more
offenders for longer periods of time.

PRIVATIZATION

States receiving VOI/TIS funds can use them for renting beds in
private prison and jails and to finance the construction or operation of
private prisons or jails. Given that VOI/TIS money is otherwise only
available for "bricks and mortar" and cannot be used for operational
uses, privatization becomes an attractive option to obtain additional
beds without having to use funds from other sources for operations.
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METHODS OF THE STUDY

"

I

The purpose of this study was to assess whether and how VOI/TIS
policies have impacted the management and privatization of prisons in
the United States. A multi-tiered research design was employed that
utilized three major methodologies: nationwide analyses of available
data, seven state-level prison management case studies, and three
I

in-depth state-level privatization case studies. These three methods
are discussed below.

1

NATIONAL DATA SOURCES

Corrections Yearbook

The Corrections Yearbook is a publication produced annually by
Camille Graham Camp and George Camp of the Criminal Justice Institute.
The publication is a compilation of annual results from surveys
distributed by the organization to state correctional agencies in all 50
states, the District of Columbia, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, along
with other criminal justice agencies. Among other thkngs, the
Corrections Yearbook provides state-level data on prison population

profile, facility characteristics, budgets, programming, and
correctional staff. The bulk of the data for the national analyses were
conducted on a database constructed from data published annually in the
Corrections Yearbook for the years 1986 through 1999.

Because of the nature of the publications, Corrections Yearbook
data must be interpreted with caution. Response to the annual surveys
is voluntary, a lack of standardized definitions means that individual
correctional agencies may vary widely in1 types o f data they report, and
the publishers do not independently verify reported data. Thus, the
Corrections Yearbook is not an ideal source of data.

Despite these

limitations, we include these data in our analyses because there is no
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other source of national data that gives us an indication of key prison

'

management trends over time.
American Correctional Association (ACA) Survey of State Correctional
Officials
TO supplement existing data sources as part of its'national

evaluation of VOI/TIS (Turner, et al. 2001), RAND contracted with the
American Correctional Association (ACA) to conduct,a special survey
among state correctional officials. The ACA fielded a survey of state
departments of correction in all 50 states and the Di$trict of Columbia
in the summer of 1998.

Thirty-seven states (including the District of

Columbia) returned surveys (72 percent).

States were asked to indicate

the extent of changes in a number of prison operations and activities
since 1996, when VOI/TIS funds became available, including the types of
offenders in prison, inmate activities and programs, prison staffing,
and effects on operations (including use of gain/good"lfime,parole,
etc.).

See Appendix B for a copy of the survey and a list of the states

that responded.
National Analyses

For the purpose of examining trends in correctional management
issues, we conducted analyses by comparing states by two major
characteristics that are of policy interest in understanding the impact
of VOI/TIS:

0

states receiving TIS funds versus those that did not

0

states that have "structured" sentencing--determinate
sentencing or voluntary or presumptive guidelines--versus
indeterminate sentencing states

We would expect that those states receiving TIS funds, all things
being equal, would experience the most pressures on prison management.
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This is because they are the ones that have passed 85% sentence
requirements for violent offenders. We include the "structured vs.
indeterminate" dimension because it represents one of the major
I

distinctions in state sentencing practices in the U.S. States with
indeterminate sentencing may be able to adapt more readily to VOI/TIS
and other "get tough" policies due to greater flexibility in the length
of sentence imposed and served.14
Table 5.1 shows how the states are distributed on these
characteristics.

In these states, terms €or violent offenders would be
constrained; however, terms for property offenders might be adjusted.
l4
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Table 5.1.15

TIS and Structured Sentencing, by State

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
I11inois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oreqon

Truth-inSentencinq

Structured
Sentencinq

X

X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

(continued on next page)

15

This table is taken from Turner et al. (2001).
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Table 5 . 1 (cont'd)
T I S and Structured Sentencing, by State

State
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyominq

Truth-innSentencinq
X

Structured
Sentencinq
X

X
X

X

x

I

X
X

X
X

X

NOTE: Classification of states having structured
sentencing is based on Bureau of Justice Assistance,
National Assessment of Structured Sentencing (1996).
Defining "truth-in-sentencing"for federal truth-in-sentencing
awards is somewhat complex. Determinate sentencing states can qualify
for funds if they have passed legislation requiring persons convicted of
a Part 1 violent crime to serve not less than 85 percent of the sentence
imposed or have passed TIS laws that result in persons convicted of a
Part 1 violent crime serving on average not less than 85 percent of the
sentence imposed.

Indeterminate sentencing states can qualify for TIS

funds if, based on existing policies, offenders serve on average 8 5
percent or more of their maximum sentence (or prison term established
under the state's sentencing and release guidelines) in prison.

These

determinations were made during the stateasapplication process for TIS
funds under the Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994.

Other states adopted versions of truth-in-sentencing legislation

with less than the federal requirement o f 85 percent or with variants of
an 85 percent criterion that did not meet federal requirements for TIS
funding .
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For purposes of the present analyses, TIS classification is based
on funding, not on whether the state passed TIS legislation--although
all but three of the states that received TIS funding also passed
qualifying TIS legislation. Thus,”the distinction between TIS funding
and passage of TIS legislation is small.16 We separate out Texas, since
its effect, particularly for quantitative measures of crime and
sentences, swamps the effects of other non-TIS states.

PRISON MANAGEMENT CASE STUDIES

The second tier of the research design consisted of case studies
in seven states. The purpose of the case studies was to gain more
detailed information about how VOI/TIS policies may have impacted prison
management. The case study states were selected to provide a mix of
sentencing structures. These states were California, Florida, New York,
North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, and Washington.

The data collection

consisted primarily of a detailed phone interview conducted with a key
individual within each state’s prison system.

In order to identify

appropriate interviewees, we utilized existing contacts within the
respective departments of corrections. We called upon individuals
(often working in a research capacity) with whom RAND had established a
previous relationship through the VOI/TIS national evaluation. These
individuals were asked to identify potential interviewees within their
state departments of correction with extensive present and historical
knowledge of the state’s prison system, including daily management
issues, departmental policy, and historical trends.

The potential

interviewees identified through this process were all senior personnel,
primarily division directors, who had worked within state corrections
for many years and in a number of capacities.

l6 New Mexico, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia were not
included as TIS states in analyses, since they enacted TIS later than
the most recently available data.
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Each potential interviewee was mailed a letter describing the

study and requesting their participation in a one-hour telephone
interview. We enclosed with the letter the list of questions that would
/ I

be discussed during the semi-structured interview and several graphs of
state-specific data from the Corrections Yearbook relevant to the
interview questions.

The potential interviewees were contacted one week

after receipt of the letter and all seven individuals agreed to
participate.

In two cases, the interviewees enlisted t5e assistance of

other staff to prepare written responses to the interview questions,
which were then submitted in lieu of a telephone interview.17 Many of
interviewees requested that their names be withheld to allow them to
answer our questions more candidly.

In honor of this request, the names

and position titles of all individuals are not being provided.
Questions for the semi-structured interview were designed to cover
the major issues of interest in prison management and privatization (see
Appendix A for the list of research questions). Interviewees were also
prompted to elaborate on some state-specific issues introduced during
the interview. In some cases additional data were requested to
supplement the information provided by the interviewee.
In addition to information gathered from interviews for the case
studies, we have also utilized responses from the five study states
(California, Florida, New York, Texas, and Washington) that responded to
the ACA survey to supplement information for the prison management case
studies.

IN-DEPTH PRIVATIZATION CASE STUDIES

Most states in the Southern United States embraced prison
privatization as one avenue for expanding prison capacity to accommodate

l7 In one instance, our contact within the research unit directly
secured the cooperation of potential interviewees within the department
and participated in the preparation of written responses to our
interview questions.
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prison population growth trends both before and after the passage of the
1994 Crime Act.

The focus of the case studies was to examine the

challenges that face public correctiona:l administrators in initiating
and managing prison privatization, and to examine the experience gained
in coping with the risks this entails. Three states were selected for

1

in-depth privatization case studies: Texas, Florida, and North
Carolina.
Searches were conducted of in-state newspaper databases to collect
news items that provided background information on the development and
performance of private prison operations in each state. Site visits
were made in all three states to conduct facility tours and conduct
in-depth interviews of government offic:Lals involved with privatization
of prisons.

Six private and three public prison tours included

interviews with facility managers, monitors, and key program staff.
Interviews were conducted with senior correctional administrators
involved with contracting, managing, and assessing private prison
operations. Officials from other state agencies who are currently
engaged in assessment of prison costs and/or performance in two states
(Texas and Florida) were also interviewed.
Requests for a wide range of documents were made, including
requests for proposals, private prison contracts, monitoring reports,
and facility audits. All available assessments or evaluations comparing
costs and/or performance between privata and public prisons were
collected and reviewed. DOC research staff in Florida were willing to
provide summary profile data from the computerized management
information system to allow for a limited comparison of the types of
prisoners held in roughly comparable public and private facilities, and
of their involvement with prison programs.
After review of the collected documents and data, follow-up
telephone interviews were conducted with key DOC managers to elicit
further information and encourage interviewees to elaborate on a variety
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The findings from the three state in-depth case

studies which follows below includes:
/I
0

a brief discussion of the history of private prison
developments in each state

0

a description of how responsibilities for management and
oversight for private prisons is allocated and executed

0

how private prison operations are contracted and monitored and
the types of operational problems encountered

0

what has been learned to date a.bout the effects of
privatization on correctional closts and performance
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VI. NATIONAL TRENDS IN PRISON MANAGEMENT

In this chapter we present national trends on the key prison
/I

management issues that are addressed in more detail in our case studies.
We begin with the analysis of prison management conducted for the
National VOI/TIS evaluation. For this evaluation, correctional
administrators were asked a number of questions regarding prison
management changes that have occurred since 1996, the year during which
VOI/TIS funds were made available to states and territories. This
analysis revealed a number of interesting findings, particularly with
respect to those states that did and did not pass TIS legislation. This
discussion is followed by analyses of nationwide trends using
Corrections Yearbook data over time, starting before the 1994 Crime Act,

as amended, was enacted and before passage of TIS legislation by many
I

individual states. Analyses are presented for TIS, non-TIS states, and
Texas. We also discuss results of analyses (often not graphed) for
states with structured versus indeterminate sentencing structures.

vOI/TIS IMPACT ON PRISON OPERATIONS: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VOI/TIS

EVALUATION^^
As part of the national VOI/TIS evaluation, we surveyed state
correctional administrators regarding the effects of VOI/TIS on prison
and jail admissions, characteristics of the prison population, effects
on prison inmate activities and programs, prison staffing, and
operations since 1996, when VOI/TIS funds became availablelg.
TIS states, non-TIS states, and Texas all reported increases in
prison populations since 1996, as shown in Table 6.1.

Texas reported

Material in this one section, IvVOI/TISImpact of Prison
Operationsrvwas taken from Turner et al. (2001); the remaining material
in the chapter is newly conducted analyses.
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significant increases in virtually every category of inmates. The only
significant difference between TIS and non-TIS states occurred in the
number of juveniles tried as adults, with TIS states experiencing a
steeper increase.

Table 6.1

Change8 in Prison Population Since 1996
~~

TIS
3.5
4.0
3.4
3.6
3.6
4.1
3.6
3.3
3.9
3.8
4.0
3.4

Non-TIS
3.2
3.7
3.4
3.6
3.4
3.6*
3.3

Texas

4.0
Violent offenders
Property offenders
4.0
Drug offenders
5.0
Other offenders
5.0
Adults
5.0
Juveniles sentenced as adults
3.0
3.0
Juveni1es
Males
3.5
5.0
Females
3.8
5.0
Offenders 50+
3.6
5.0
Offenders with drug/alcohol needs
3.5
3.0
Offenders with physical health problems
3.7
5.0
3.5
3.2
5.0
Offenders with mental health problems
* p e .0520 (l=substantiallydecreased; 5=substantially increased)

Many inmate activities and programs have also increased since
1996, though the increases are, for the most part, relatively small.

TIS states had significantly more inmates housed in secure units than
non-TIS states, while Texas saw large increases in inmate gang activity,
infractions, and assaults on staff, as well as in inmates housed in
secure units.

Details of changes in inmate activities and programs are

given in Table 6.2.

l9 States were asked to rate increases/decreases since 1996, and to
attribute the percent of the change attributable to VOI/TIS.
Unfortunately, due to missing data, we were unable to use the latter.
2 o Texas was not included in significance testing, which applies
only to TIS states vs. non-TIS states.
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Table 6.2
Changes in Prison Inmate Activities and Programs dince 1996

TIS

Non-TIS

Texas
3.0

Inmates who work regularly
3.6
3.4
Inmates being educated regularly
3.4
3.3
3.0
Inmates with outside recreation
3.3
3.1
3.0
Inmates with visitation privileges
3.2
3.0
3.0
Inmate drug treatment programs
3.6
4.0
3.9
Inmate drug testing
3.9
3.8
3.0
Inmates who test positive for drugs
3.3
2.8
3 .O
Inmate gang activity
3.4
3.4
5.0
3.2
3.2
' 3.0
Inmate appeals
3.8
3.2*
5.0
Inmates housed in secure units
Inmates double-bunked
3.4
3.4
3.0
Inmates triple bunked
3.2
3.1
3.0
Inmate infractions
3 -4
3.3
5.0
- Inmate assaults on staff
3.1
3-2
5.0
* p e .0521 (l=substantially decreased; 5=substantially increased)

'

With the increase in inmates has come a corresponding need for
more staff, as illustrated in Table 6.3.

At the same time, staff

training has increased very slightly if at all, and Tkixas admitted that
staff qualifications have actually decreased since 1996.

Table 6.3
Changes in Prison Staffing Since 1996

TIS
Non-TIS Texas
3.9
3.7
5.0
Number of staff
Male staff
3.8
3.5
5.0
Female staff
3.5
5.0
3.9
Staff qualifications
3.1
3.2
2.0
Hours worked by staff
3.1
3.4
3.0
3.2
3.4
-Hours of training
Security training
3.2
3.2
-Physical training
3.2
3.2
--Other traininq
3.2
3.1
NOTE: (l=substantially decreased; S=substantially increased)
Texas claims no changes in prison operation since 1996, and other
states report relatively small changes, ,as well, as shown in Table 6.4.

21 Texas was not included in significance testing, which applies
only to TIS states v s . non-TIS states.
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The use of good time/gain time has declined in both TIS and non-TIS
states, as has use of parole in TIS states only.

Table 6.4
Changes in Operations Since 1996
~

~

TIS

Non-TIS

Texas
Use of good time/gain time
2.3
2.7
3.0
2.5
3.1*
3.0
use of parole
post release supervision (other than parole)
3.2
3.5
3.0
Inmate classification
3-3
3.1
3.0
3.3
3.2
3.0
For risk
For programming needs
3.2
3.2
3.0
For prison manaqement
3.3
3.3
3.0
* p e .0522 (l=substantially decreased; S=substantially increased)
Our analyses show that in the last few years, prisons have seen
increases in all types of offenders, not just violent offenders.
Although positive prison activities (such as inmate work, education, and
recreation) have been increasing, so have negative behaviors such as
gang activity, infractions, and assaults on staff. Housing has been
affected with more offenders in double- and triple-bunking and more
offenders housed in secure units.

Prison staffing has increased as a

likely result, but training and staff qualifications remain about the
Same over the past few years. The use of gain/good time is already
declining, as is parole in TIS states (although other forms of
post-release supervision have increased).

It is not possible for us to

determine what percent of these changes are due to TIS legislation
itself; however, we see many similar changes in both TIS and non-TIS
states, suggesting these some of the changes are the result o f laws and
policies in place other than TIS.
Over the course of the past few years, states reported relatively
modest use of VOI/TIS funds for private beds.

Table 6.5 presents the

numbers of beds built with VOI/TIS funds by the end of 1999 and the
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Fewer than 10 states used VOI/TIS
I

funds to add beds f o r violent offenders using this mechanism.

2 2 Texas was not included in significance testing, which applies
only to TIS States versus non-TIS states.
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Table 6.5
I

State Uses of VOI/TIS Funds Through December 31, 1999

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
DC
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
I11inois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
:&ode Island
south Carolina
south Dakota
Tennessee
I

Constructed
200
20
1240

Beds
Under
construction

0
175
0
48
600
0
212
576
400
0
0
0
196
400
0
200
0
394
0
0
0
15
3825
144
0
32 0
0
0
180
3450
0
0
22
499
0
0
68
768
161
170

95
0
0

332
1164
580
0
1310
0

5730
755
268
0
70
0
256
17
80
3 10
0
0
0
2060
223
0
4280
0
960
0
0
0
0
1500
192
240
1226
12 1
50
2 96
20
1164
0
256

Leased
373
213 '
0
0

150
0
0'
0
0
0
0
0 ,
0
0
0
0:
0
0
0
0

301
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
500
0
0
0
0

46
126
0
0
0

(continued on following page)
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0
0

'

0

0
0

Total
668
233
1240
332
1339
580
198
1910'
0
5942
1331
568
0
70
0
452
417
80
510
0

3 94
0
2361
223
15
8105
144
960
320
0
500
180
4950
192
240
12 94
746
0

2 96
88
1932
161
426

-

State
Texas
Utah
Vermont
virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
wyominq
Amer. Samoa
Guam
N. Marianas
Puerto Rico
virqin Islands
TOTAL

Constructed

48

-

Beds
,
Under
construction

0
64

0
0
0
0
0
0

761
784
161
0
128
302
973
96

0
0
0
0
0
25,244

0
0
0
0
0
2,088

66
0
12
0
64
42 ,794

128
186
659
0

0

64
15 ,462

Total

379
0

0
0

66
0
12

Leased

382
720
I61
0
0
1.16
3 14
96

HISTORICAL TRENDS IN PRISON MANAGEMENT ISSUES

We turn now to an historical presentation of these major issues in
prison management.

These data are from the Corrections Yearbook,

described in more detail in Chapter 5.
Long Sentences

Our respondents from the national VOI/TIS survey indicated greater
numbers of offenders being sentenced for longer periods of time. Figure
6.1 shows that this has not translated, however, into greater

percentages of offenders having prison sentences of the longest
length--20 years or more.

In fact, the trend seems to be fairly flat

over the past 10 years, with some decreases overall, and for TIS and
non-TIS states since the mid 1990s.

Texas shows a far greater

percentage of offenders with sentences of 20 years or more than the
national average.

Indeterminate states generally show lower percentages

of prisoners with the longest sentences.
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It may be that the increases reported by states are for sentences
I

less than 20 years. This is supported hy the fact that the average
sentence lengths imposed has ranged between about 60 and 80 months over
the past decade (Turner et al. 2001) based on data on prison releases
from the National Correctional Reporting Program.

I
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Special Populations

One of the concerns about longer sentences is that they will lead
to a llgraying" of the inmate population.

Information on the percentages

of inmates aged 50 or older reveals increases over the past decade,
starting before T I S legislation was enacted in many states.

Patterns

for TIS and non-TIS states, as well as for structured and indeterminate
sentencing states are very similar, suggesting this trend may be due to
factors other than sentencing structures (such as the aging of the
population).

Data on the number of offenders with tuberculosis at

intake, per 1000 inmates shows larger increases in the past several
years for all states.
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Inmate Classification

Over the past decade, the percentage of offenders at high/close
custody level has decreased overall, as well as for TIS and non-TIS
states.

Since 1994, the levels have been fairly constant. TIS states

generally have larger percentages of offenders in high/close custody
than do non-TIS states.. Similarly, structured sentencing states
generally have higher percentages of offenders in high/close custody
I

than do indeterminate sentencing states.

+TIS

Fig. 6.5

-

Percentage of Inmates at High/Close Custody Level

costs

costs have risen for prisons over the past decade, with the
exception of Texas, which has seen decreases in the reported average
total cost per inmate per day since the mid 1990s.

TIS states report

the highest costs per day; indeterminate states report higher costs per
day than structured states; however reported costs are fairly similar
for all states except Texas.
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Crowding
Prisons are operating over rated capacity, particularly over the
past several years.

In Figure 6.7 we present the prison population as a

percentage of rated prison capacity.

Texas shows the lowest crowding.

Since 1995, structured and indeterminate sentencing states show similar
patterns, despite differences in the early 1990s.
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Safety

We examined safety by the numbers of inmate misconduct reports,
assaults of inmates on inmates, and assaults on staff by inmates. The
number of inmate misconduct reports per inmate has remained relatively
flat since 1995, except for non-TIS states. For the latter, misconduct
reports fell from 1994 to 1997 and have been increasing in the past two
years. The patterns for inmate assaults on staff have dropped
dramatically for non-TIS states but have remained relatively flat for
TIS states. Inmate assaults on other inmates have remained relatively
flat since 1995 for TIS states.

Similar to the pattern for inmate

assaults on staff, non-TIS states have shown large decreases in inmate
assaults on each other.
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Grievances
Similar to assault, the pattern of .inmate.grieva.nceshas remained
relatively flat since 1996.

Texas reported grievance rates several

order of magnitudes larger than the national average. TIS states show
the lowest rates of grievances filed.
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S t a f f Response

Correctional staff turnover has shown dramatic increases over the
past decade, nationally, for TIS and non-TIS states, as well as Texas.
Non-TIS states show the highest rates of correctional staff turnover.
In recent years, structured sentencing states (figure not shown) have
shown the highest rates of turnover--from 12 percent in 1997 to almost
20 percent in 1999.

In contrast to turnover, the extent of initial

correctional officer training appears to have remained relatively flat,
with some increases during the past few years. Hours of in-service
correctional officer training (figures not shown here) indicate
approximately 40 hours of training over the past decade nationally.
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Health Care

Extensive measures of health care were not available in our
database; however, in addition to the measures of TB mentioned above, we
/ I

were able to examine reported levels of inmates who tested positive for
HIV as well as those with AIDS.

Figure 6.14 shows the rate of inmates

who tested positive for HIV, per 1000 inmates. From relatively high
rates in the early 199Os, rates nationally have been declining over the
past: five years or so. However, rates in Texas have increased during
the past several years. States with indeterminate sentencing structures
generally show higher rates of HIV as well as AIDS.
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Inmate Programming

The percentage of inmates assigned to full-time or part-time
academic or vocational training has fluctuated during the past decade,
however, the trend appears to be slightly downward. TIS states
generally show slightly lower rates of participation than non-TIS
states. Texas shows the lowest rates of participation, with a sharp drop
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The percentage of inmates assigned to prison industry (figure

I

not shown) has decreased steadily over the past 10 years, from under 10
percent to just over 5 percent. TIS states generally show slightly
lower percentages of offenders asdigned than non-TIS states.
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Summary of National Trends

Overall, our national analyses suggest one of two patterns.
Changes in some measures have occurring over the past decade and some
measures have remained fairly constant. We do not observe sharp changes
for TIS states about the time of many states were passing TIS
legislation in 1994. In some instances, TIS states show higher levels
of prison management concerns (such as percent of inmates at high/close
custody, misconduct reports), but for other variables, non-TIS states
show higher levels (such as inmate assaults).

We did not find strong

evidence for our hypotheses regarding the potential impact of TIS on
prison management variables.

This may be due to several reasons.
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Averaging over states in these analyses may mask important state level
experiences.

In addition, data are available only during the first

several years after TIS legislation was passed in many states. As we
found in our national VOI/TIS evaluation, we may need to wait several
more years in order to gauge the impact of such sentencing policies.

i
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CASE STUDY PRISON MANAGEMENT FINDIN9S

In this chapter, we synthesize the information gained from the
seven case study interviews. We also include selected responses from
five study states (California, Florida, New York, Texas, and Washington)
that responded to the 1998 American Correctional Association (ACA)
survey to supplement information from the intervieiw.23 Findings are
presented for the major research areas asked of respondents.

LONG SENTENCES

States were asked whether they experienced an increase in the
number of inmates required to serve long sentences with restrictions on
early release.

If so, they were asked to indicate the cause of this

increase in long-term inmates and whether these inmates share particular
characteristics, such as youth, violent convictions, dr drug
convictions.
All seven of our interviewees reported that sentences had indeed
become longer within their states.24 The majority of these indicated
that sentencing lengthening came as the result of either changes in
sentencing or release policies.

For example, Oregon, California, and

Washington are among the states that have enacted legislation
lengthening sentences for violent and repeat offenders. Texas has seen
sentences lengthen largely from a reduction in parole and other early
release compounded by additional get-tough legislation.

In 1994, North

Carolina adopted structured sentencing, which has actually worked to

23 North Carolina and Oregon did not respond to the ACA survey, and
New York responded only to a subset of questions. When reporting on ACA
survey responses in this chapter, we include only those states that
responded to a particular question.
24 In response to the question about length of sentences, our
California interviewee referred us to data reported by the state to the
U.S. Department of Justice. These data indicaeed that sentences had
been lengthening in California.
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reduce overall admissions because of a reduction in incarceration of
less serious offenders. Violent and repeat offenders are receiving and
serving longer sentences than prior to the reform. California, Florida,
I

New York, and Washington also reported :Longer sentences in the ACA
survey, particularly for violent offenders.
.

In fact, all of the interviewees who responded to this question

indicated that violent offenders were the category of inmates most
impacted by lengthening sentences.25 In North Carolina, there has been
a shift to a "more potent" prison population because the share of
violent offenders has been steadily growing since the adoption of
structured sentencing. Texas has experienced an increase in youthful
violent offenders, due in part to legislation lowering the age at which
juveniles may face adult penalties. However, in the ACA survey, Texas
reported no overall increase in youthful or juvenile offenders.

In

addition to increases in violent offenders in general, Florida has seen
a dramatic increase in female inmates convicted for violent and other
offenders. Our Florida interviewee viewed this partly as a result of a
greater willingness of judges to send women to prison.

Texas and

Washington also reported an increase in female offenders in the ACA
survey, while California reported a decrease.
In sum, our interviewees consistently reported that inmates in
their states are now serving longer sentences than in the past, that
these changes are largely due to changes in sentencing and early release
policies, and that violent offenders represent the category of inmate
most impacted by these changes.

These trends are echoed in ACA survey

responses.

25 The California interviewee did not provide an answer to this
question because no analyses of changes in characteristics have yet been
conducted to inform the response. Our New York interviewee did not
provide a response to this question.
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SPECIAL POPULATIONS

States were asked whether there had been an increase in inmates
with special needs, such as physical or mental health care, or drug
treatment.

In addition, respondents were asked whether their state

experienced or is anticipating an increase in older inmates.

If so,

respondents were asked if any preparations or plans were being made for
the medical care, housing, and/or management o f this group of inmates.
~ l but
l
one of our interviewees (New York) reported that there has
been an increase in the number or share of inmates with special needs.
Inmates with mental health needs were described as a major concern by
most of the interviewees (Oregon, California, Florida, and North
Carolina).26 Texas reported in the ACA survey a large increase in
inmates with mental health problems.

Some respondents'(Ca1iforniaand

Florida) suspected that improved methods of screening and identification
of mental health needs might account for at least some of the observed
increase in need.

In the remaining states (Texas and Washington), the

special needs population showing the most growth is older inmates.

In

the ACA survey, Florida reported an increase in inmates with physical
health problems, and Texas reported a substantial increase.
When asked specifically about older inmates, all of our
respondents reported that the share of older inmates in the prison
population had either increased (California, Florida, New York, Oregon,
Texas, Washington) or is expected increase in the future (North

.

Carolina).

In the ACA survey, Texas reported a substantial increase in

the population of older prisoners.

This growth in older inmates was

explained by all interviewees who responded as a result of sentencing
policies lengthening sentences and restricting early release.27 The

26 Our North Carolina respondent classed mental health needs as a
subcategory of general health care--the need for which has increased in
recent years.
27 No explanation for the increase in older inmates was provided by
our New York respondent.
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most common accommodation undertaken or planned in response to the
I
change has been special housing for older inmates. Our Texas and
Washington interviewees reported that their states have already
established special housing facilities for older inmates and our Florida
interviewee stated that legislation authorizing the construction of such
a facility had been recently passed.

These facilities may provide

assisted living services and programming appropriate to the abilities of
ageti inmates. Such facilities have been informal$y discussed in both
Oregon and North Carolina, but the present size of the older population
does; not yet Warrant a Separate facility. Our Califor,niainterviewee
reported that internal assessment has been underway in recent years in
preparation for continued growth in the older inmate population.

Plans

have been made for the establishment of a "task groupYto address the
issue.

INMATE CLASSIFICATION

States were asked if Truth in Sentencing (TIS) or other "get
tough11 sentencing policies have impacted inmate classification, such as
how it is conducted, factors considered in determining classification,
number of classification hearings, or amount of paperwork involved in
the process.

They were asked if there had been a change in the share of

inmates at each classification level, such as more inmates classified at
higher custody levels.
Less than half of our interviewees (three of seven) reported that
classification has been impacted at least somewhat by TIS and other
"get-tough"sentencing policies.

Our California, Texas, and Washington

interviewees reported that these policies have impacted classification
because length of sentence is used in determining classification level.
This has increased the need for space in more secure facilities and at

2 8 Our New York interviewee did not report any specific
preparations or plans for responding to the growing number of older
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higher custody levels within these facilities. Our California
interviewee reported a change in the procedures and factors that are
taken into account in classification committee reviews, such as the
establishment of different eligibility criteria for earned credit and
program participation based upon the sentencing status of the inmate.
Paperwork has also increased as a result of additional requirements for
tracking inmates' status and eligibility for privileges.

In the ACA

survey, none of the study states reported changes in inmate
classification.

COSTS

States were asked whether there had been an increase in the cost
of incarceration due to TIS or other "get tough" sentencing policies.
If so, they were asked to indicate in what categories costs have
increased (for example, total dollars, health care, segregation,
administration, and programming).
Most of our interviewees did not directly implicate TIS and other
"get tough" policies for increased costs within their state's
correctional system. Generally, the respondents indicated that recent
policy changes have occurred within a context of an increasing prison
population, making it difficult to sort out independent influences.
Several interviewees (California, Florida, North Carolina, and
Washington) mentioned the potential for future cost increases,
particularly due to the health care and other special needs of older
inmates incarcerated due to "get tough" sentencing policies.

Our

Washington interviewee described one potential method for controlling
costs associated with aging inmates, termed extraordinary medical
placement.

This method is to grant medically needy inmates who are

eligible for other sources of support (such as social security) a form
of furlough that allows them to receive care in a less-costly community

inmates in that state.
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This option is available for only some categories of long-term
I
inmates, but is expected to produce some overall cost'savings.
setting.

The need for new construction was also a cost that was discussed
as relating either directly or indirectly to changes in sentencing
policy.

our Florida, Oregon, New York, and North Carolina interviewees

mentioned that recent sentencing policy changes have contributed to the
need for more prison space or are projected to do so in the future.
1

CROWDING

States were asked whether prisons had become more crowded in
recent years.

If so, they were asked how much of the crowding they felt

was due to TIS or other "get tough" policies. They were asked how these
policies make prisons more crowded (for example, limiting early release,
sentencing more inmates to prison, sentencing inmates to longer terms).
They were also asked whether it has become necessary to grant (or has
consideration been given to granting) ea.rly release to some inmates to
make room for long-term or higher risk inmates.
All but two of our respondents (California and New York) reported
that crowding was either currently a problem or is expected to grow in
the future due to "get tough" sentencing policies.

Our New York

interviewee described an effort over the past six years to add maximum
security capacity and divert lower risk offenders that is Viewed as
successful in controlling crowding. Our California respondent reported
that California prisons are currently operating above capacity, but
indicated that state data did not reveal a relationship between crowding
and TIS and other sentencing policies.

Washington reported in the A m

survey that double- and triple-bunking had increased by about 2 percent
because of VOI/TIS.
Oregon, North Carolina, and Washington are currently experiencing
a reprieve from crowding. Both our Oregon and Washington respondents
described recent construction efforts that have alleviated crowding
problems the states had been experiencing.
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to our respondent, the reprieve is due to a structured sentencing scheme
1

adopted by the state in 1994. Under it, low-level offenders are no
longer sentenced to prison so many previously used prison beds are
currently available. All three states consider the present situation to
be temporary and anticipate increased crowded conditions as more inmates
are sentenced under TIS and related policies.
In Texas, our respondent reported a struggle with crowding
throughout the past decade. New capacity and use 'of private facilities
has reduced the problem somewhat, but the present sentencing policies
are expected to produce a return to the high levels of crowding the
state experienced prior to the new construction. Within Florida,
crowded conditions are a particular problem within facilities that house
special populations.

Our respondent reported that get-tough policies

have added to the numbers of females and youths in the prison
population--groups requiring separation from the rest of the population.
Construction has not kept pace with the growth in these populations and
crowded conditions are expected to worsen in the future with the
addition of more inmates.
Most of our interviewees (California, Florida, North Carolina,
Oregon, Texas, and Washington) reported that early release is not
granted to some inmates to make room for long-term or higher risk
inmates. our North Carolina respondent added, "the public would not
stand for that."

In response to questions on the ACA survey,

California, Florida, and Washington reported a decrease in good
.

time/gain time, while Texas reported no change.

Some interviewees did

report efforts to divert some inmates from prison beds.

Our New York

respondent described the diversion of lvlowlevel" drug offenders from
prison to treatment programs and the availability of a boot camp program
for qualifying non-violent first-time offenders.

Washington also

operates a diversionary boot camp program and a "work ethic" camp. Our
respondent reported that the programs arc not currently operating at
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full capacity, due to a lack of inmate volunteers who meet program
eligibility requirements.

SAFETY

States were asked whether there has been a change in the safety of
prisons, such as an increase in inmate-on-inmate or inmate-on-staff
assaults.

If the level of safety has changed, respondents were asked

how much of this seems to be related to TIS or other "get tough"
policies.

They were also asked if additional safety and training

procedures or policies regarding the use of force have been considered
or implemented.
Our interviewees were split in their responses about safety.

Both

our New York and Oregon respondents reported safer facilities today
relative to the past.

In New York, this was attributed to construction

that increased the capacity to segregate disruptive inmates. Our Oregon
interviewee stated that the state has yet to determine why assault rates
have decreased over the past two years.

One possible explanation is

that in the past, inexperienced staff, particularly those in new
institutions, had not yet acquired the skills necessary to control
inmate behavior.

The declining rates of assault may indicate increases

in staff ability to maintain order.
Both Florida and Washington have not generally experienced any
change in prison safety.

Our Florida respondent reported that state

data do show an increase in both inmate-on-inmate and inmate-on-staff
assault, but these can be attributed to the adoption of a standardized
reporting format, rather than a reflection of inmate behavior.
Safety has declined in the prisons of California, North Carolina,
and Texas, according to our interviewees and the ACA survey.29 Inmates

29 Our California respondent did not provide a response because
there have been no analyses of the relationship between safety and
sentencing policies. In the ACA survey, California reported an increase
in assaults on staff but declined to attribute the change to VOI/TIS.
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I

in both North Carolina and Texas were described as more violent and

'

,

1

difficult to control. Our Texas interviewee attributed this to get
tough policies that remove early release incentives for good behavior
within prisons.

In the ACA survey, Texas reported a substantial

increase in assaults on staff.
Additional safety and training procedures or policies regarding
,

the use of force have been implemented in some states. Our California,
Oregon, and Washington respondents reported that sAfety training has
increased as a component of general training in response to the growth
of the prison population--not in response to concerns 'abouta more
violent population.

Conversely, respondents from North Carolina and

Texas stated that training for staff has increased as a result of
concerns about the nature of the prison population.

For example, Texas

has increased its training in hostage negotiation, and North Carolina
has expanded training in extracting non-cooperative inmates from
cells.30 Florida reported in the ACA survey that staff training had
increased.

OR1EXANCES

States were asked whether there has been an increase in inmate
grievances. They were asked to indicate to what extent TIS and other
"get tough" policies might be responsible for this.
In the majority of states, the number of grievances was described
as unchanged (Florida, North Carolina, Oregon, and Texas) or down from
previous years (New York).

Only our California and Washington

interviewees reported an increase in inmate grievances. Both
respondents did not consider TIS and other get-tough policies to be
responsible of the increase. Our Washington respondent stated that
there is a relationship between change in the routine maintained within

30 Our Florida and New York respondents did not provide information
about staff training on use of force.
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I

a facility and grievances. Thus, greater times of change generate
I

higher levels of grievances.

,

1

STAFF RESPONSE

States were asked to indicate whether staff workloads or schedules
changed as a result of TIS or other "get tough" policies.

They were

asked whether changes in the composition of the prison population have
I

affected staff morale, stress levels, absenteeism, attitudes, turnover,
disability claims, or retirement levels. In addition, respondents were
,
asked whether correctional officers' associations or unions sought to
make any changes, such as increased safety training or staffing levels.
While changes in workloads and schedules for staff working within
state prisons were reported, no interviewees attributed these changes to
TIS

(31

other get-tough policies.

Heavier workloads were reported (North

Carolina, Oregon, Texas, and Washington), but these were attributed to
high vacancy levels and staff turnover brought on by strong state
economies and low pay for correctional officers.31 Requirement of
overtime work was a factor mentioned by our North Carolina and Texas
interviewees that increases staff stress and increases turnover. In an
effort to address this issue, North Carolina is pilot testing a new work
schedule in some of its facilities.

Shifts have been extended to 12

hours in order to condense the workweek, which reduces the number of
times staff must commute per month and makes is easier for staff to
secure a second job to supplement low pay.

To date, staff response has

been very positive and no adverse impact on facility operation has been
observed.
In Florida, our interviewee described inmate idleness as a major
cause of low staff morale and increasing stress levels.

Since the

3l Our Oregon respondent described this as a regional issue.
Filling staff vacancies and reducing staff turnover is more of a
challenge in the rural Eastern region of the state than in the urban and
suburban Western region.
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legislature prohibited the purchase of recreation equipment, boredom has
become a problem for both staff and inmates. As a result, the latter
were described as more difficult to control. The correctional union in
Florida lobbied against the legislation in anticipation of these
problems, but was unsuccessful.

Correctional unions in both Oregon and

Washington have lobbied for increased staffing levels. The remaining
states did not report special activities on the part of correctional
unions or associations. Texas reported in the ACA survey that staff
qualifications had decreased, while the number of staff had
substantially increased.

HEALTH CARE

States were asked to indicate the major health concerns among the
state's prison population.

They were asked whether they felt TIS or

other "get tough'' policies have influenced these concerns (for example
the availability of, or access to, care or treatment for assault
injuries). They were also asked to indicate the state's policies for
testing inmates for TB and HIV; and whether there had been an increase
in the share of inmates infected with TS or HIV.
The major health concerns described by our interviewees were
hepatitis C (California, Florida, Oregon, North Carolina, Texas), 32 HIV
(Florida, Oregon, Texas), tobacco (North Carolina), mental illness
(Florida, washington), dental hygiene (Washington) and special needs of
older inmates (Florida, Oregon, Texas, Washington) . 3 3

Our California

and Washington interviewees view TIS ana other get tough policies as
contributors to health concerns because these policies lengthen the

Though it is considered the major health care concern, our North
Carolina respondent stated that hepatitis C has not yet become a problem
within the prison population. Based on the experience of other states,
North Carolina expects to face the disease in the near future and is
taking proactive steps to reduce its impact.
33 Our New York respondent did not provide information on the
state's major inmate health concerns.
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sentences of inmates with chronic conditions. None of our interviewees
saw any other implications of get tough policies for inmate health care.
All respondents reported that inmates are tested at intake for
TB .34

Our California respondent skated that inmates are also routinely

tested for TB before being transferred between institutions. With the
exception of Oregon, all respondents reported that H I V testing occurs at
the request of an inmate or medical personnel.

Our Oregon respondent

reported that all inmates receive H I V testing at intake.

INMATE PROGRAMMING

States were asked whether changes i.n sentencing policy or changes
in prison populations (if any) have affected the type or availability of
programming, such as work, education, and treatment opportunities.
Only one respondent (Oregon) indicated that the type and
availability of programming has been impacted in recent years by changes
in the prison population.

Dramatic growth has outpaced the ability of

the state to establish meaningful programming for large numbers of new
inmates. Efforts within the state have focused on increasing
programming designed to improve release preparation and to involved
inmates in statutorily mandated work programs.

In the ACA survey,

however, Washington reported increases in the percentage of inmates who
work regularly and those being educated regularly. All four states that
responded (California, Florida, Texas, and Washington) reported an
increase in inmate drug treatment programs, with California reporting a
substantial increase. Except for Texas, the same states also reported
an increase in drug testing, as did New York, and again California's
'

increase was described as substantial. Texas reported no change in drug
testing. Washington estimated that VOI/TIS accounted for a

5

percent

34 Our Texas respondent did not provide information on the state's
policy for TB testing.
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increase in drug testing. No other state attributed any of the
1

programming changes specifically to VOI/TIS.

UTILIZATION OF PRIVATE PRISON FACILITIES

AS noted in the previous chapter (see Table 6.51, in o u r national
evaluation of the VOI/TIS Incentive Grant Program, we found that the use
of leased beds has been relatively small. By the end of 1999, over
15,000 new beds had been constructed and an additional 2 5 , 0 0 0 were under

construction, while only about 2,000 beds had been leased. Eight states
(Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, and
Texas) reported using VOI/TIS funds for leasing beds.
Moreover, from our ACA survey, we find little relationship between
voI/TIS and other "get tough" policies a.nd the use of VOI/TIS funding to
lease beds from private correctional facilities. Texas reported a
substantial increase (more than 50 percent) in leasing of beds at the
state level due to the utilization of VOI/TIS funds. Yet Texas was not
a TIS state, and as will be seen in the next chapter, its u s e of leased
beds was atypical. No other study state reported an increase in leased
beds, nor did any (including Texas) report leasing beds for local
correctional facilities, e.g., jails.
In the next chapter we utilize case studies of three states
(Florida, North Carolina, and Texas) to (explorein more detail the use
of private correctional facilities.
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VIII.

-

PRIVATIZATION CASE STUDY FINDINGS

/ I

DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE STATE PRISONS

Privatization of state prisons was initiated in Florida, North
Carolina, and Texas during periods when the prison systems in all three
case-study states were struggling with high rates of population growth
and serious problems with overcrowded facilities. Policy-makers in
these states expected that privatization would provide speedy expansion

of prison capacity, and would do so at a lower cost for both prison
construction and operation.
The fledgling private prison industry entered two states, Texas
and Florida, early on.

CCA received its very first government contract

from the Immigration and Naturalization Service in 1984 to operate a
private INS Ifprocessingcenter" in Houston, Texas. Privatization by CCA

of the local jail in Panama City, Florida in 1985 was hailed,
nationally, as one of the first private sector success stories.
Contracts for privately-operated state prisons would come later in these
states. The first four private prisons in Texas opened in 1989.
first in Florida, a prison for women, was opened in 1995.

The

It was not

until late in 1998 that the first private state prison in North Carolina
would be ramped-up for business.

THE HISTORY OF PRIVATE PRISON DEVELOPMENT IN TEXAS

The Texas legislature enacted legislation to authorize
privatization of prisons in 1987 during a period when both the prison
population and correctional costs were skyrocketing in the state. After
a massive class action lawsuit was brought in federal court near the end
of the 1970s to challenge prison conditions, the state had been obliged
to increase spending on correctional services. The per diem cost for
prison operations in Texas was just $13 ILn 1980; by 1990 per diem costs
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d $40. Many st te policymakers

3w privatizz ion as an avenue

to expanded prison capacity at a lower cost.
The legislature authorized four private state prisons, and
/I

appropriated $30 million for this purpose.

In 1991 the legislature

voted to expand the scope of privatization, authorizing construction of
an additional 2000 beds.

Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ)

officials negotiated contracts for two Mew 500-bed prisons, and 500-bed
expansions were provided at existing institutions. The Institutional
Division is currently responsible for 79 of 105 TDCJ facilities.

of

these, private vendors under contract to the Institutional Division
operate six facilities.
The Texas S t a t e J a i l System

A new round of private prison contracting by TDCJ was initiated

when, in 1993, the "State Jail" system was created.

The Texas

legislature had adopted sweeping sentencing law revisions that year
which established a new category of criminal offenses designated as
"State Jail Felonies." The intention of the reform was to divert
offenders who might otherwise end up in regular state prisons, and to
keep them close to their homes and community support systems. State
Jails are completely distinct from local. county jails, having been
established by Texas policy-makers specifically for confinement of State
Jail Felons--relatively less serious drug and property offenders with
little or no prior criminal records who could be sentenced to up to two
years in these new minimum-security facilities.
The State Jail system currently consists of 17 facilities, ranging
in size from 667 to 2216 beds.

Of the 3.7 State Jails, five are

privately operated. The Wackenhut Corrections Corporation and the
Management and Training Corporation operate two facilities each, with
the remaining facility operated by the Corrections Corporation of
America.
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Other TDCJ Contracts for Private Prison Beds

In addition to the private prisons discussed in this report--the
six private prisons under contract with the Institutional Division, and
/ I

the five private State Jails under contract with the State Jail
Division--TDCJ maintains contracts for other private prison beds.

The

parole Division has contracts for 4,711 private beds in nine facilities,
including one private prison operated by Wackenhut at Lockhart, Texas.
The Institutional Division also leases 3,578 private beds in seven local
private facilities in order to avoid crowding in the state institutions.
Taken together, the 19,245 private beds under contract with TDCJ
comprise 12 percent of TDCJ capacity, which currently totals 155,512
beds (Texas Department of Criminal Justice February 28, 2001; Texas
Department of Criminal Justice December 20, 2000).

,

DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE PRISONS IN FLORIDA

Seeking to attain 'Itruth in sentencing" and to reduce sentencing
disparity, the Florida Legislature adopted a system of determinate
guideline sentencing in 1983 and ended parole release, although
sentences were still reduced one-third through "gain time." Admissions
to prison began to rise dramatically in the late 1980s, nearly doubling
from 22,512 in FY87 to a high of 43,330 in FY90 (Florida Economic and
Demographic Research 2000). In 1988 new sentencing laws were introduced
to provide tougher penalties for "habitual" and violent offenders. But
until 1994, prison population growth was somewhat controlled through a
series of administrative mechanisms for early release (administrative
gain time, provisional credits, and control release). In 1994 the
sentencing guidelines were restructured .in an effort to conserve prison
bed space. Gain time was eliminated, and by the end of the year,
control release was almost eliminated.
Faced with a steep prison population growth curve in 1989, the
legislature moved to authorize the Florida Department of Corrections

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view
expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

-

78

-

(DOC) to contract for both private construction and private operation of
I

prisons.

Chapter 89-526 specified that private prisons would have to

produce "substantial savings" but the legislature did not set a specific
benchmark for cost savings. Reluctant DOC officials moved very slowly
toward contracting for construction of the state's first private prison.
Frustrated that the private prison contracting process had
remained mired for so long in a myriad of difficulties, the legislature
set up a completely separate private prison contracting agency. Chapter
93-406 of Florida statutes, enacted in 1993, created the Correctional

privatization Commission (CPC), a five-member board appointed by the
Governor.

While the CPC is housed within the state Department of

Management Services, it is functionally independent of that agency, and
from the DOC.
The Florida prison system currently consists of 128 correctional
facilities comprised of prisons, work and forestry camps, work release
centers, and drug treatment centers. Currently the prison system houses
more than 71,000 prisoners but has excess capacity and is maintaining a
huge bed surplus. Specifically, 6,317 prison beds are being held in
reserve without staffing to reduce per diem costs and increase
operational efficiency. The institutional system includes 52 prisons
managed by the Department of Corrections and five that are privately
contracted through the CPC.

PRIVATE PRISON DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA

In 1988, under a federal court order to reduce overcrowding, an
emergency release law had been enacted by the North Carolina legislature
in order to limit the state's prison population level within a
population trcap.'t
The prison cap bill called for early release of
prisoners to keep the population under agreed-upon capacity limits.
Under the emergency release System, some of the state's prisoners would
serve as little as one-eighth of their sentence.
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In 1989 the legislature had directed an ambitious program of

prison expansion, authorizing use of bonds to fund prison construction.
Between 1990 and 1999, North Carolina would spend $336 million on prison
/I

expansion.

By 1993 the state's policymakers were also poised to

introduce a sweeping reform designed to replace the early-release
provisions with a sentencing structure designed to keep prison
populations within the expanding prison capacity limits.
North Carolina's "Structured Sentencing Law'' was enacted in 1993,
and took effect in October of 1994.

The: new system incorporated

truth-in-sentencingby requiring that prisoners serve at least 8 5
percent of the sentence imposed. The sentencing guidelines were designed
to take account of the anticipated expansion through use of a computer
simu:lationmodel.

The sophisticated program was used to set sentence

ranges designed to ration the states correctional resources in a fashion
I

consistent with the added confinement capacity authorized by the
legislature.
But before the sentencing reforms could bring prison population
growth under control, the highly-publicized murder of basketball star
Michael Jordan's father in the summer of 1993 by a parolee shocked North
Carolinians and brought the early-release practice under intense fire.
Managers at North Carolina's Department of Corrections (DOC) responded
by tightening the release valve.

The prison construction program was

moving too slowly to absorb the resulting population increase and so DOC
managers began a search for private prison beds located in other states
to house the overflow of prisoners (Associated Press October 23 1993).
After North Carolina had shipped hundreds of prisoners to private
out-of-state prisons, the concept of prison privatization w i t h i n the
state jumped to the foreground. During the 1995 legislative session
House leaders injected privatization into the administration's
already-robust prison building effort.

Funding for two 500-bed

medium-security private prisons was approved that year. The two private
prisons were embraced by the administration as a "pilot project," a
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chance to test whether they would save tax dollars (Associated Press
I

'

I

January 2, 1996).
out-of-state housing was seen as both a stopgap and a trade-of€
that would solve the temporary prison-bed short-fall. At the height of
the prison population crunch, North Carolina exported upwards of 2,000
prisoners to four private prisons in other states at an annual cost of
$20 million (Rawlins October 17, 1999). The state's experience with
I

contracting for out-of-state prison beds was mixed, at best.
Correctional services obtained from Copell Corrections in Rhode island
I

were satisfactory, but very expensive compared to costs in North
Carolina.

Contracts with CCA for beds in Hinton, Oklahoma and Mason,

Tennessee were more economical, but presented other difficulties.
\

MANAGEMENT OF PRIVATE PRISONS

A review of the management experience in the case,study states

brings to light many interesting issues about the risks inherent in the
undertaking, and suggests the difficulties that public correctional
administrators face as they struggle to manage those risks.
Responsibility for Management of Private Prisons

AS is the case in all the states that contract for private prison

beds except Florida, private prison contracting and management has been
the responsibility of the agencies that manage public state prisons.

As

has been discussed above, Florida legislators became frustrated with the
level of resistance to privatization they encountered within the state's
Department of Corrections, and set up a separate, independent agency,
the Correctional Privatization Commission, to facilitate the contracting
and management of the state's private prisons.
The North Carolina Department of Corrections channeled
responsibility for private prisons to an already-existing contracts
administration unit within the Division of Prisons.

Direct

responsibility for management and oversight fell to the Assistant
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Director of Auxiliary Services--who carried these responsibilities from
I

the initiation of the first contracts with private prisons in Rhode
Island, Texas, Oklahoma, and Tennessee to hold overflow prisoners in the
early 199Os, to the conversion to public management of two North
Carolina CCA-managed prisons on October 12000.
In addition to the Assistant Director, a variety of other central
DOC staff carried responsibilities related to operation of the CCA
prisons.

DOC staff would schedule the transfer of prisoners to and from

the private prisons. They monitored case management functions as'well
as the maintenance of accurate and prompt entry of data in the Offender
population Unified System (OPUS). Grievances filed by prisoners would
be investigated and resolved by DOC staff if they were not quickly
settled. All classification-level promotions and demotions required
approval by DOC central staff. DOC staff performed pre-employment
background investigations including criminal history checks for all
',

prospective private prison employees.
The Texas Department of Criminal Justice had split up
responsibility for these functions, with the Assistant Director €or
Contract Management in the Institutions Division carrying responsibility
for contracts with six private prisons holding general population
prisoners, as well as for extra capacity beds in seven
privately-operated local facilities. Until recently, contracting and
managing the five private State Jails was handled by staff in the State
Jails Division who also managed those directly operated by TDCJ.35 Nine
more private facilities hold prisoners under the authority of the Parole
Division, which has a "Specialized Programs" unit that has managed
contracts with both for-profit and non-profit companies to provide
pre-parole transfer facilities, intermediate sanction facilities,
multi-use facilities, halfway houses, work program facilities, county
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jail beds, residential substance abuse <services,and a variety of
non-residential services. Our report is focused on the Institutions
Division and State Jail contract facilities.
Florida remains the only state that has created a body entirely
separate from their correctional services agency for the sole purpose of
contracting for private construction and operation of prisons.
According to the executive director of the Correctional Privatization
Commission (CPC), the "politics of privatization" have impeded
replication of the model elsewhere.
The CPC has been a lightning rod for controversy in Florida.
Exclusion of any representation from the DOC on the Commission means
that the state's correctional services agency has no input as to where
private prisons will be built, or for what custody levels they will be
designed.

The CPC effectively obligates the DOC to place prisoners in

private facilities without review or agteement as to their design
specifications or staffing plans (Office of Program Policy Analysis and
Government Accountability 1995).
The decision to establish a separate CPC has resulted in dual
corrections administrations.

The CPC is seen by many state officials as

a "mini DOC," and is widely perceived as an avid proponent for
privist ization.
Contracting for Private Prisons at TDCJ

Fourteen years of experience with contracting and oversight of
private prisons by TDCJ's Institutions Division has produced a highly
professional team of managers and a model set of procedures for managing
the risks inherent with the undertaking.

The Institutional Division

contracting process is framed by a highly detailed request for proposals

35 In a major reorganization currently underway, this
responsibility is now being shifted to the Institutions Division, as is
responsibility for the secure facilities that have until now been
contracted and managed by staff in the Parole Division.
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that is draft 2 by TDCJ staff t

,

-

specifI the exact provi ic

,'i

that will

be required in the contract.
The contracting philosophy is that private prison vendors should
lldo it our way." The contracting strategy is to hold them accountable
to clear and precise standards for contract performance.

TDCJ

contractors are obliged to maintain conf'ormity with every applicable
TDCJ policy, as well as the policies established by the Windham School
I

District (educational program from inmates), unless prior written
approval of proposed alternative policies is obtained from TDCJ.36'
I

Requests for approval of optional policies have not occurred during the
contracting process, but arise later as particular operational issues
crop up.
Bidders for contracts are requested to propose a'leveland quality

of program services at least equal to those provided in public prisons,
and to provide these at a lower cost than incurred by public operation.
Bidders are instructed to provide detailed information about all
operational costs they would propose (direct, indirect, and profit
margin).

Detailed operational plans are also required covering all

aspects of proposed prison operations, as well as procedures for
self--monitoring;
proposed procedures for turning over of operations in
the event of bankruptcy or inability to perform contract duties;
emergency security procedures; an organizational chart and staffing
plans with accompanying job descriptions, salary ranges, qualifications,
and job duties required.
The contractor cannot retain upper level management staff for
employment without prior approval by TDCJ officials. The staff training
curriculum for private prisons must be approved, and the number of hours
of academy and in-service training must be equivalent to those provided
to public prison staff.

36 Contractors are free to establish their own operational and
management procedures to accomplish TDCJIs established goals as
expressed in its policy statements.
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To safeguard the liberty interests of prisoners, Texas statutes
I
limit the delegation of authority from TDCJ to private prison
contractors in certain areas.

For example, TDCJ retains the

responsibility for computation of release and parole eligibility dates;
the awarding of "good time" credits; the approval of furloughs or
pre-parole transfers; and classification decisions that would place a
prisoner in less restrictive custody status.
Determination of routine disciplinary matte&

may be delegated to

the private prison staff. However, private prison staff are obligated
to report disciplinary infractions (and as well, good 'behavior) to TDCJ
officials. The private prison officials may make recommendations, but
hearings on major disciplinary violations (those which might affect the
duration of a prisoner's time in prison) are conducted only by TDCJ
staff .
When a prisoner is suspected of a major disciplinary infraction,
the specifics of the case are provided to the TDCJ morktor who
determines if the case is major, i.e., one that might result in
administrative segregation or affect the length of the prisoner's term
of incarceration. When cases such as these arise, the prisoner
transferred to a public prison for a hearing, where he or she likely to
remain, regardless of the outcome.

If the infraction is not determined

to be major, a variety of sanctions may be imposed at the discretion of
private prison staff, including restricted access to recreation,
commissary, or visitation.
Enforcement of policies given particular importance by TDCJ are in
areas that have given rise to inmate grievances and legal action.
Contracts delegate limited powers to private prison staff. Use of force
by contract employees is restricted to that which is necessary for
self-defense; for restraining prisoners who present an llimminentand
immediate threat" to others; to prevent serious damage to property; to
maintain or regain control "in the event of a mutiny, rebellion, riot,
or disturbance,Il or to isolate or confine a prisoner in enforcement of
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prison rules and regulations, "where lesser means have proven
ineffective." Deadly force (use of firearms) is restricted to
situations presenting threat of serious injury to an individual; to
prevent escapes; or where lesser means have failed to quell a mutiny,
rebellion, riot, or disturbance.
Access to state and federal courts, to legal counsel, and to
public officials and agencies is intended to be available for all
private prisoners.

Prison law libraries must contain all resources

required under court orders and TDCJ rules.

Services are to be provided

to prisoners by a licensed attorney under a sub-contract with the
private prison company. Private.prison contractors are obliged to
implement TDCJ's grievance procedure and provide all necessary
resources.

SELECTION AND TRANSFER OF PRISONERS TO PRIVATE PRISONS

Texas' recent experience with the private prisons has been
relatively problem-free. TDCJ officials believe that the key factor in
managing the risks associated with private prison contracting is careful
screening and selection of private prisoners. While medium custody
prisoners may be confined in private prison under Texas statutes, the
Institutions Division Administrator for Contract Facility Operations
reports that TDCJ officials have never contracted private beds for
prisoners above the minimum custody level, believing that safe
management of medium custody prisoners requires a more labor-intensive
staffing plan than private vendors offer.
To be considered for transfer to a private prison, an inmate must
be classified at the minimum custody level, with no recent major
disciplinary infractions. Mental health status is taken into account in
screening, since TDCJ officials believe that private prisons do not
provide the best environment for such inmates.
In Florida, most of the prisoners transferred to private prisons
are classified to the medium or minimum custody levels. The DOC
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managers that handle this function also stress the necessity for careful
I

screening of candidates for transfer. The CPC-contracted private
prisons are perceived by most state officials to be more program-rich
than DOC institutions, functioning more or less as pre-release
facilities for lower custody-level prisoners who are clQser to release
than the general population in DOC institutions (Florida Corrections
Commission 1996). For example, many prisoners may be assigned to
1

private prisons for less than one year before being sent to work release
or being released to their home communities.
I

Decisions about what prisoners to transfer to private prisons,
their classification levels, the disciplinary actions taken against
them, application of gain time rules, or any other matters that would
affect the custody or release of prisoners are determihed by DOC staff,
who retain responsibility under Florida law for any decisions affecting
the liberty interests of the prisoners transferred to'private prisons.
Transfer decisions are made according to available bed capacity at
appropriate classification levels, determination of medical and
psychological needs, and treatment and training requirements. Medical
treatment needs also considered, since medical costs are capped in
private facilities. In addition, Florida DOC makes an effort to

cluster^^ prisoners with certain types of medical problems (e.g., heart
condi.tions) in public institutions where they can provide a
concentration of medical specialists and provide treatment and
medications at the least cost (Florida Corrections Commission 2000).
Generally, if prisoners develop costly health problems, or engage
in behavior resulting in classification to a higher custody level, they
are transferred to the public prison system. According to Florida DOC
classification staff, major differences between public and private
prison operations in result from dissimilarities in the prisoner
population.

The private prisons house healthier, better behaved,

lower-cost inmates.
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The North Carolina DOC contracted with CCA for ope ation of the
I

two private prisons. All prisoners sent to CCA's prisons would be
screened and selected by central administrative DOC staff to assure that
DOC institutional managers did not attempt to transfer problem inmates.
Selection of prisoners for transfer to and from private prisons was done
according to established criteria that were shaped by their prior
experience with contracting for private prison beds in other states.
I

To be eligible for transfer to private prisons, medium custody
prisoners had to be able to work or maintain a program assignment'ona
I

full-time basis.

They must have maintained a good behavioral record,

pose no escape risk, and have no serious medical or psychiatric
treatment needs.

Eligible prisoners were allowed to volunteer for

transfer.
Significant misconduct, such as serious violence and attempted
escape, would normally result in transfer back to a North Carolina
public facility.

Transfer would also occur if a prisoner was

reclassified to a higher or lower custody status, or if they developed a
serious medical or psychiatric need. After six months of assignment to
a private prison, prisoners with a good institutional behavior record
may request to transfer to a public facility.

MONITORING AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT

The most artfully written contract may be undermined in the
absense of close oversight and effective enforcement of the terms. The
experience in the case study states reveals how much effort may be
required to execute these challenging functions.
Overaight in Texas

Five of six private prisons under contract in Texas have a
full-time on-site monitor responsible for assessing contract
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compliance.37 The monitor functions under TDCJ-devised procedures for
monitoring and auditing all prison operations. Monitoring is designed
to cover contract compliance issues as well as compliance with policies,
ACA standards, state laws, and applicable court orders.

Reports cover

all aspects of prison operations.
Detailed plans for self-monitoring of operations and assessing the
success of rehabilitation programs must be submitted for TDCJ approval.
The program assessment plan is supposed to contain clearly defined
goals, outputs, and measurable outcomes related to the objectives of the
program.

A private prison contractor must develop an information system

capable of tracking and evaluating the achievement of outcomes.
An

extensive schedule of reports is also required to document

operational performance and service delivery, ranging from a weekly
"Vacant Position Report,I1and a monthly report on delivery of healthcare
services, down to a quarterly "Aluminum Can Sales Report.I1
Private prison contracts establish TDCJ's right to audit, inspect,
and test all operations and services required under the contract, and
require 'Ireasonably promptq1access to all financial, employee, and
prisoner records maintained by the contractor without limitation.
Monitoring may also include audits by TDCJ administrative staff and
representatives of the Windham School District.

The contractor must

allow entry to the prison facility at all times for state legislators
and executive officials, members of the judicial branch, and all
authorized investigators, auditors, emplloyees or agents of TDCJ and the
Texas Board of Criminal Justice.

In event of non-compliance with contract provisions, a private
prison contractor is notified of the specifics, and given 20 days to
resolve the issue. Within that time limit, private prison managers must

37 The B.M. Moore Correctional Center in Overton is located about
ten miles from the privately-operated Bradshaw State Jail in Henderson.
Both facilities are managed by the same contractor and the t w o
facilities share a single monitor.
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file a written response, detailing the steps and methods that have been
taken to come back into compliance.
While monetary sanctions are available to enforce contract
requirements, TDCJ managers do not conceive of these as liquidated
damages or penalties taken against vendors. They are unwilling to pay
for services that have not been delivered, however, and have sometimes
withheld significant amounts of money where this has occurred.
Failure to meet contract obligations within defined timeframes
will result in specified monetary withholdings, absent extensions
granted by TDCJ officials. Money may also be deducted by TDCJ when the
contractor fails to meet and maintain acceptable performance standards.
Oversight in Florida

Responsibility for monitoring and contract enforcement in Florida
currently rests with the Correctional Privatization Commission. Chapter
957 of Florida Law requires that private prisons must seek and obtain

accreditation under American Correctional Association (ACA) standards,
as well as all state laws and applicable court orders.

The CPC set up a

system of on-site monitoring in each of its contract facilities. CPC
monitors are provided with an office at the facility, and are expected
to submit monthly reports. Until recently, these reports were augmented
by annual monitoring visits by an independent contract monitoring team.
Authority for monitoring Florida's private prisons has been a bone
of contention between the DOC and the CPC.

The DOC Office of the

Inspector General conducts biennial management reviews of public prisons
that cover a wide range of issues.

In 1997 the DOC announced it would

also conduct management reviews at private prisons but CPC managers
resisted, arguing that such reviews would be redundant.

They pointed

out that under Florida law, their facilities were not subject to DOC
rules or policies to the extent that such were Ilinconsistent with the
mission of the commission to establish cost-effective, privately

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view
expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

- 90 -

operated correctional facilities" (Florida Corrections Commission
1996).38 The DOC retains limited authority for audits and inspections.

Early in 2000 the Florida Corrections Commission (FCC) became
concerned about whether an adequate level of monitoring was being
conducted by CPC staff at the private prisons.

FCC investigators

requested copies of the monthly monitoring reports for all facilities
operating under CPC contracts. The primary concern they raised after
review of these documents was about large gaps in'reporting during
periods of many months' duration at three facilities due to on-site
monitor positions being vacant.
FCC staff has also raised a number of other issues related to
inconsistent reporting formats from facility to facility that made
facility comparisons difficult. They also cited data errors and
discrepancies regarding security staff vacancies and prisoner
disciplinary hearings.

On the basis of their review} the FCC

recommended to the Governor that the CPC be abolished and that the
contracting and monitoring function should be transferred back to the
Department of Corrections.
Oversight in North Carolina

Managers at the North Carolina Department of Corrections (Doc)
also assigned full-time contract-compliance monitors to work onsite at
each of the two CCA prisons.

The monitors reported directly to a member

of the senior executive team at the DOC Division of Prisons responsible
for management of the CCA contracts.

In addition to daily onsite

monitoring, a team of DOC operational specialists was appointed and
charged with conducting an annual internal audit of all aspects of
private prison operations.

3 8 The provision of law that exempts CPC facilities from DOC rules
and policies is viewed as allowing a "double standard" by some state
officials.
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A detailed set of ethical standards was established for private
prison monitoring staff to govern issues like conflict of interest;

maintenance of professional relations with private prison staff,
inmates, their families and assocfates; and handling of confidential
information.
The monitors tracked compliance with contract requirements and
applicable DOC policies and procedures on a 'iCompliance/ConcernTracking
Log." Each issue was summarized and dated, with documentation of prompt
notification of private prison staff. When an issue was resolved, a
summary narrative and date was entered. When no resolution was obtained
within a mutually-agreed time frame, monitors filed a corrective action
plan with identified requirements for resolution. when no resolution
was reached, the monitors made formal recommendations to the Doc's
senior management team for addressing the failure with formal sanctions.
I

After embarking on privatization of state prison facilities, one
of the case study states also garnered extensive experience with the
business of private prisons through involvement with facilities that had
been built lionspeculation." Once built, contracts for housing prisoners
would be forthcoming from government agencies. These 'spec" prisons
have had a history containing incidents of prison homicides, escapes,
riot:;, political corruption, and other ethical issues.

I

"SPEC" PRISONS

Texas was once the world capitol of rrspecrl
prisons.

Over the

decade after the Institutional Division established the first four TDCJ
contracts in 1987, the business of prison privatization exploded in
Texas. A compensation agreement forged in 1991 between the state and
prisohers
local. jails being used to house thousands of "state-readyil
awaiting transfer to TDCJ facilities turned the state prisoner backlog
into a local economic development opportunity. Some counties expanded
their jails beyond local needs to create space that could be leased out.
Other counties issued bonds to build new jails specifically for private
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operation.

Eight private jail facilities were financed across the state

I

in 1991 through such bonds.
While local jail authorities were seeking contracts with TDCJ to
house transfer prisoners , the pri&te

jail developers were also

beginning to exploit more lucrative opportunities to import prisoners
from overcrowded prison systems outside the state. By 1994 the backlog
population of state prisoners warehoused in local facilities peaked at
30,000 but a massive TDCJ prison expansion plan was beginning to produce

a new prison beds at the state level. Local officials began to feel a
financial pinch.

Many counties had become dependent on the large state

funding stream ($260 million in 1993) that housing state-ready prisoners
were providing (Ward November 17, 1994).

If the local beds remained

empty, massive layoffs of jail staff would be required. Thus, Texas
counties were soon scrambling to secure contracts to house out-of-state
prisoners.
I

By 1996 there were 38 private prisons either operating or soon to
open in the state, including 21 facilities contracted with TDCJ to
operate as state prisons, parole facilities, or "state jails." Qthers
were operating under contracts with federal agencies. But some were
operating completely free of oversight from either Texas or federal
correctional officials. And by 1997, local private facilities were
housing nearly 5,500 prisoners from othefa:states.
The operational problems associated with private laspec"prisons
became evident when a series of events began to draw attention from the
media.

In 1996, two sex offenders from Oregon were apprehended 200

miles from Houston 11 days after they escaped from CCA's 411-bed Houston
Processing Center.

State and local authorities had been told by CCA

that the facility was being used by the INS to hold immigrants facing
deportation. Criminal offenders were also being confined in the
facility and the Oregon Department of Corrections had leased 240 beds
from CCA to house sex offenders. After the arrest of the escapees, the
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local prosecutor determined that the inmates could not be prosecuted for
escape because CCA had no statutory authority to detain them.
When asked by Houston reporters, a CCA spokesperson insisted that
the company was under no obligation to notify state or local authorities
about what prisoners were held at the facility.

"We designed and built

the institution. It's oursr1(Walt August 30, 1996).

Concern about the

problems in rlspecll
prisons further escalated after a riot involving 400
detainees at CCA's Eden Detention Centelr.

In response, the Texas

legislature enacted new laws pertaining to operation of IIspecIl prisons
and the practice of importing prisoners from other states.
provisions made it a crime to escape from a private prison.

The new
In

addition, private prison operators were required to have some
contractual relationship with local authorities and private guards would
have to be licensed by the state.
Despite these reforms, the difficulties in nspecll
prisons
persisted.

There were problems of escapes and disturbances, and

complaints (by both prisoners and by out-of-state contracting agencies)

about inadequate food service and medical care, poor security and
classification procedures, and inexperienced, inadequately trained
staff.

Public concerns were raised again when it came to light in the

media that the deputy director at the Commission on Jail Standards (an
agency given charge of monitoring the private facilities) was being paid
$42,000 a year in addition to his state salary to moonlight as a

consultant for one of the private prison companies whose facilities he
oversaw (Walt November 12, 1997).
Caught in an intense media spotlight, Texas backed away from its
I

role as the leading "host state" for prisoners imported from other
states' prison systems. By January 2001 there were no longer any
prisoners housed in private facilities in Texas under contracts from
other states.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view
expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

-

94

-

PRIVATE PRISON OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS

Most of the operational difficulties encountered with private
prison contracting in the case study states have occurred during the
/I

early years of facility operations. The problems associated with
activation of new prisons are also familiar in the public sector but
these difficulties are exacerbated within in the private prison industry
due largely to structural personnel issues.
When public prisons are activated,,corrections managers are able
to build a staffing plan on a platform of experienced personnel.

A

sizable group of experienced correctional officers are typically
transferred from other facilities within the state, under leadership of
a qualified, seasoned management team.

Even the largest private prison

companies cannot afford this flexibility. The industry leaders are
national companies (two are transnational). Transfer of large numbers
of staff to new facilities built in isolated rural areas is not a
I

financially attractive proposition. Moreover, the industry is still
quite new, with most private facilities operating for less than a
decade.

Given that turnover among the staff is generally three times

higher than that for the public corrections field, those who maintain
private prison employment may be promoted at a level of experience below
that required in the public corrections system.
The current labor market for correctional workers is extremely
tight:, making it very difficult for private prison companies to keep
wages low and continue to fill vacancies.

The result has been high

rates of position vacancies at private facilities. Supervising a
relatively inexperienced staff that is working long hours of mandatory
overtime in order to keep the security posts covered, many private
prisons managers are finding themselves contending with high levels of
staff burn-out and exhaustion.
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Problems in Texas

Within a year of activation of the first four private prisons
under contract with the Institutions Division, state officials found
I

that the private operators were failing to provide the level of
education programs and medical care required under the contracts. In May
1990, a TDCJ audit gave low marks to both CCA and Wackenhut. Wackenhut
was cited for inadequate school programs, low enrollment for substance
abuse treatment, and deficient delivery of medical and dental care. CCA
had instituted just one of seven vocational training courses required by
state contracts and was deficient in provision of medical care. .Both
companies were cited for use of excessive force by staff (Ward May 16,
1990).
For the past few years, private pri.son operations under TDCJ
Institutions Division contracts have seemed relatively uneventful.
private operations of State Jail facilities in Texas have been far from
problem free, however. At the Travis County State Jail, staffing issues
were the main problem.

Job turnover was extremely high and

under-staffing soon became a chronic problem. TDCJ audits documented
that Wackenhut was failing to fill vacant positions and staff in
accordance with the approved staffing plan.

Auditors found that

staffing records had been falsified. Shift rosters did not agree with
payroll timesheets.

Programs were not fully staffed and many teachers

were uncertified. Vocational classes had not been implemented.

There

was a shortage of uniforms, underwear, shoes, blankets, and towels.
TDCJ officials responsible for managing the state jail system held back
$625,000 in payments to Wackenhut over two years in connection with

unfilled staff positions (Quin September 1, 1999; Ward and Quin
September 2 , 1999).

The take-over by the State Jail Division occurred

at the beginning of November.

TDCJ officials found that Wackenhut had

not been performing necessary maintenance to the TDCJ-owned facility
plant.
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Problems have recently developed in a second privately-operated
State Jail located north of Austin.

In late August 2000, two prisoners

escaped from CCA's Bartlett State Jail. TDCJ investigators found that
closed-circuit surveillance monitors were not being watched when the two
made their way out of the prison and the perimeter fence alarm was
ignored (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, State Jail Division
September 7 , 2000).
Problems in Florida

If there are serious operational problems in CPC contracted
facilities, they have not risen to a level sufficient magnitude to draw
sustained media attention of the sbrt found in many other states.
Because the private prisons in Florida are air conditioned and allow
amenities (such as television) not present in Florida's public prisons,
most prisoners would probably prefer them to the public prisons.
Moreover, according to DOC officials, violent behavior,islikely to
resu:Lt in a prisoner's transfer back to the public system. These
factors, coupled with the fact that many private prisoners may be
nearing their release date, create a strong incentive for good behavior
at the private prisons.
Start-up problems at CCAIs Lake City Correctional Facility
included high turnover and extended vacancies in counselor and
instructor positions. The facility has been under the management of at
least. three warden since its opening. One facility did not receive a
license to operate its drug treatment program for 10 months after they
began providing these services. State ahd federal regulations regarding
special education services were not met until intervention by the State
Department of Education. With the assistance from the DOC, a corrective
action plan was developed and implemented over a period of 18 months.
News reports have recounted at least two escapes from Wackenhutls
South Bay facility (Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government
Accountability March, 2000).
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Problems in North Carolina

,
North Carolina's private prisons were activated after the wide
p~lb].icity surrounding the many types of problems that have plagued
private facilities, including some of those that had been used to house
the state's overflow prisoners. Anticipating that operational problems
might arise, DOC managers negotiated separate contracts for each
facility.

Under one contract, the prison facility was leased by the
I

state.

The second contract covered prison operations. Echoing the

Texas approach, contract specifications for these facilities required
,
the private contractor to manage operations strictly in line with the
Doc's policies for publicly operated prisons.
The contracts specified that all private prison security staff
would be required to possess the same qualifications as are required for
employment at DOC prisons.

Starting salary levels were roughly

comparable but benefits were more limited at CCA compared to the DOC.
The same basic educational programs and medical services were to be
provided at the private prisons as at medium-security state facilities.
In addition, each private prison was to incorporate a 63-bed
fltherapeuticcommunity" drug treatment program and each was supposed to
provide 100 llmarket-wage'l
jobs for prisoners by recruiting private
businesses to set up industry shops within the prisons.
From the start, there were issues of compliance with contract
requirements at both facilities. High levels of turnover were
particularly problematic at the supervisory level because it was
resulted in the promotion of relatively unseasoned, inexperienced staff.
One marked difference in personnel practices between CCA and the public
prison system pertained to promotion of security staff. While state
prison correctional officers are required by civil service rules to gain
many years of seniority and experience before they can qualify for
promotion, some staff at CCA's prisons were reported to receive much
more rapid promotions. Apparently CCA personnel were eligible to
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advance to a management position comparable to a DOC captain within a
matter of months, rather than years.
Prison work assignments were also not meeting contractual levels.
The monitor assigned at one facility observed that many prisoners
receiving a work assignment were not constructively engaged in full-time
work.

The lack of adequate work assignments produced more than just the

problem of idle time. Under North Carolina laws, prisoners' "gain time"
is dependent on their having an assignment.
Another frequent issue raised was non-compliance with the DOC
inmate grievance process.

Grievance complaints were being filed at

roughly double the normal rate at DOC facilities. Audit results showed
that many CCA personnel practices were found to be non-compliant with
DOC policies.

The facility's employment roster was out of date, showing

a number of staff that were no longer employed at the facility, while
omitting the names of others who were employed. Employees filling
senior positions did not appear to meet the standards for education,
experience, or training required of their counterparts at the DOC.
Counselors had received just half of the required hours of training.
Many personnel files lacked the records required to verify educational
credentials, or documentation that they had met requirements for
background checks, medical examinations, or urinalysis.
CCA

was found to be non-compliant in a variety of fiscal

administrative matters, such as lacking proper procedures for the
handling of negotiable instruments, lacking an adequate inventory
control process, and failing to provide monthly financial reports to the
DOC.

Canteen records were inaccurate at one facility.

Prisoner medical

records were not being properly maintained at another facility, and a
variety of discrepancies were found in the handling of drugs in the
prison pharmacy.

There were few controls over processing of receipts or

payment of invoices at the facility. There was no internal inventory
control. At the same facility, education programs were found to be
severely deficient.
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Problems with staffing and services continued to plague
I
the CCA
operations and DOC managers worried that more severe difficulties might
lie ahead if CCA did not bring both facilities into compliance. DOC
managers were holding back payments to CCA due to unfilled positions.
Each. vacancy in the Education Department was costing CCA an amount equal
to the entry-level salary paid teachers at the local community college.
Responding to the job shortfalls at botli CCA prisons, DOC managers began
1

withholding an amount equal to the speciified daily 'Iroom and board"
deduction from per diem payments to CCA for each industry job that was
I

not provided.

By June 2000, managers at: the DOC had withheld $1. million

in payments because of chronic staff vacancies and the failure to
provide most of the contracted industry jobs for employment of
prisoners.
CCA's managers seemed to be unable to satisfy the contractual
DOC to discuss
obligations. They approached the executive staff at Fhe
,
the problem, warning that unless some financial adjustments could be
made to provide CCA with more leeway, the company might not be able
continue operations on such an unprofitable basis.

DOC managers decided

to negotiate an amicable termination of the two private prison
management contracts with CCA. After less than two years, the DOC
announced it would terminate CCAIs five-year management contracts. DOC
managers moved to assume all aspects of operations while continuing to
lease the prison facilities from CCA.

On October 12000, the state

assumed management of both facilities.

ASSESSMENT OF CORRECTIONAL COSTS AND PERFORMANCE

The burgeoning expense of prison expansion in the U.S. appeared to
drive privatization of correctional services forward for a decade and
half of fast growth.

While the debate on the matter of cost savings has

been vigorous, the body of rigorous, credible research on performance
quality is extremely limited. And to date, credible evidence of
significant savings is scant.
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Texas has yet to produce an "apples to apples" comparison of
I

private and public prison costs, relying instead on comparisons of
private prisons with "hypothetical" or "prototype"public institutions.
In North Carolina, a planned research project to examine the costs and
performance of private prisons was abandoned when the state took over
their operations. Of the three case study states, only in Florida has a
substantial effort has been undertaken to examine these issues in
sufficient detail to produce findings on which policymakers can rely.
Costs in North Carolina

,
I

While the per diem fees paid to CCA totaled about $50,39 state
officials were aware that comparing these figures with the average daily
cost of $67 at state-operated facilities gave a deceptive impression of
cost savings. Medical costs were capped under CCA's contract, and DOC
managers made sure that only healthy, tractable prisoners were sent to
,
the private prisons. Other hidden costs (e.g., transportation,
monitoring, central administration) boost the actual expenditures for
privatization (Rawlins November 17, 1999).
Plans for a comparison study of cost and quality conducted by
researchers at North Carolina State University were set aside when it
was determined that the management contracts would be terminated.
Consequently, adequate data to compare either the quality or the true
costs of CCA's operations with public prisons in North Carolina is not
available.
Cost Issues in Texas

There are many elements of private prisons management in Texas
that result in a private prisoner population that should be both easier

39 The state paid separate fees for operation of prison services
and for lease of the facilities. At one facility, the per diem for
services was $36.14, while the annual lease fee of $2,865,600 adds an
extra $14.87 per prisoner per day; at another the per diem was $35.94,
and the lease fee ($2,757,522) adds $14.31.
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and cheaper to manage than the general population in public prisons.
While the Texas legislature specified that both medium and minimum
custody prisoners could be housed in private prisons, TDCJ officials
have restricted use of these prisons for minimum custody prisons only.
private prisons under contract with TDCJ do not operate close custody or
administrative segregation units.

If prisoners are charged with serious

misconduct, they are transferred to pub:Lic prisons.

Private prison

facilities also lack the capacity to provide Ifin-patient"medical or
psychiatric care,

SO

prisoners who develop a need for such services are

also transferred to public prisons.

Prisoners with HIV may be

transferred to private prisons, but if they do note require
hospitalization.
According to information available from various state agencies
that track correctional costs in Texas, the average per diem costs at
private prisons have actually declined slightly since the early days of
contracting.

The negotiations were conducted within a framework that

set a contract limit of $38.28 for 1989-"-afigure that was 10 percent
less than the cost estimate ($42.53) determined by the Legislative
Budget Board for operation of fthypotheticallt
state-run units of the type
to be contracted. The per diem costs for the first four contract
facilities were negotiated at $34.79 for the biennium ending August 31
1989 and $35.25 for the biennium ending August 31 1991 (Sunset Advisory

Commission 1991).
Although per diem costs have not risen, it is by no means clear
how much savings--if any--is being realized through private operation of
prisons in Texas. The Texas Sunset Advisory Commission (SAC) was
initially charged by the legislature with determining if the first four
private prisons to be contracted were meeting a ten-percent cost-savings
benchmark.

The SAC had been created by the legislature in 1977 to

identify and eliminate waste, duplication, and inefficiency in
government agencies.

In 1991 analysts at the SAC reported that Texas'

private prisons were operating at close'to the 10 percent benchmark, and

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view
expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

-

102 -

that after accounting for Itmoneypaid in lieu of tax revenues,Il the cost
savings reached 14 percent (SAC 1991) . 4 0
The SAC study was not an "apples to apples" comparison, however.
Since the TDCJ operated no compafable public prisons, they constructed a
hypothetical model prison for comparing costs, the same methods that had
been used initially to determine the cost benchmark for contracting
purposes.

Although their legislative directive included comparing the

quality of services, without actual public prisons at hand, the SAC
anal.ysts were unable to meet this mandate (Texas Comptroller of Public
AcCC)UntS 1991).
While security costs may be less in the private prisons in part
because of a more compact, efficient facility design, they are also
likely to be lower due to the nature of the confinement population.
Minimum-security prisoners at the pre-release stage may not require the
same level of security staffing as the general prison population
I

confined in public facilities. Moreover, the cost estimate for private
prisons did not include all of the types of costs absorbed by TDCJ
(Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts 1993).
The most recent cost estimates avfiilable from the Criminal Justice
Policy Council indicate that privately contracted State Jail facilities
were operating at a per diem cost of $28.64 in fiscal year 2000,
compared to $32.08 at the public state :jails. A per diem estimate of
I

4 0 While the initial plan had been for the facilities to be
constructed an owned by the vendors, it was later decided that costs
would be less if the state took over this function. Because the state
owns the facilities, property taxes are not assessed. But by contract,
the vendors pay local governments an annual amount in lieu of the taxes
that would be owed if they owned the properties. In 1998 CCA withdrew
from its TDCJ contract for operation of the Cleveland facility after
failure to resolve a dispute over payments due to the city. In 1995 CCA
had slashed a $180,000 payment-in-lieu of taxes to $80,000 in order to
pare costs in the face of stiff competition when its contract was re-bid
by TDCJ. The Cleveland school district filed a lawsuit that was settled
in 1998 when CCA agreed to pay the $300,000 arrears, but when the school
board requested an independent audit of CCA's financial condition, CCA
pulled out of the state contract. Wackenhut agreed to take over
management at an increased per diem fee of $5 more than CCA had
received, and to pay the full amount required (Horswell November 24,

1998).
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$37.25 was reported for private prisons operated under contract with the

Institutions Division. This figure included housing costs, minor
medical services, transportation and leases. Costs for TDCJ
administrative services, monitoring, major medical costs, and diagnostic
and classification services were not included. The estimate reported
for a 1000-bed public institution housing general population prisoners
was $37.34.

Average per diem costs for additional capacity contracted

by the Institutional Division in local county facilities was reported to
be $39.96 (Criminal Justice Policy Council 2001).
Cost and Quality Assessment in Florida

The most comprehensive set of comparison studies of public and
private prison performance and costs has been undertaken in Florida.
Section 957.07 of Florida Statutes mandates a savings of at least 7
percent for private prisons that confine an adult population.
Determination of whether the private prisons are meeting this
requirement has proved to be a difficult and contentious enterprise.
The public and private prisons are not comparable in terms of either
facility design or level of program services. State legislators have
charged that private prisons contain costs by llcherry-pickingll
healthy
and well-behaved prisoners (Croft March 15, 1998).
Addressing the challenge of providing an accurate comparison of
public and private correctional costs in their state, Office of Program
Policy Analysis and Government Accountability (OPPAGA) analysts have
struggled to overcome the lack of fully comparable facilities by making
their best judgments about how to adjust costs to account for
differences in the size of institutions, the types of prisoners they
confine, and the programs they offer.

Over a period of six years they

produced a series of studies that, taken together, chronicle the
development of prison privatization in Florida and give a wealth of
detailed information about their operations.
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In 1998, OPPAGA analysts conducted a comprehensive review of both
construction and operational costs for two privately run facilities.
They concluded that cost savings goals were not being met, and that only
one of the private prisons produdkd any cost savings in FY 1996-97
(OPPAGA 1998).
TO compare private construction costs with public costs OPPAGA

selected three public prisons opened in the same year (1995) as the
private facilities. The public prisons were built on land donated by
local governments, yet site preparation costs for roads, sewage
treatment, and other infrastructure development exceeded the combined
site! acquisition and preparation costs for the private prisons.
Construction costs per bed, however, were comparatively lower for the
public prisons.
At least in part, the lower site 'costsfor the private prisons
I

were attributed to their more compact design, less accessible location

of the more spread-out trcampus'l
style public facilities. The DOC is
able to utilize the labor of prisoners for some aspects of construction,
reducing costs by an estimated 16 percent.

The higher per-bed

construction costs at CCA's Bay Correctional facility reflect a design
that provides two-person cells for all prisoners, while Wackenhut's
design included dormitory housing for many prisoners.

Florida's public

prisons also rely largely on dormitory housing and so CcA's Bay
I

Correctional Facility proved to be the most expensive of all to
construct, costing 1 percent more per bed than the most expensive public
prison in the comparison.
OPPAGA analysts determined that neither prison was meeting the
statutory requirement of 7 percent savings. CCA's operations at Bay
Correctional Facility had produced no cost savings at all, while
Wackenhut operated its Moore Haven Correctional Facility at a savings of
4 percent.
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Comparing the quality of correctional services, analysts at OPPAGA
I

concluded that correctional service performance at the private prisons
was roughly consistent with performance reported by the public prisons.
The two private facilities reported lower rates of assaults and
disciplinary incidents, while reporting higher levels of attainment of
GED certificates and completions for education and treatment programs.
But the analysts noted that the profile of the prisoners seLected for
transfer to private prisons might account for these differences.
Reviewing contract requirements for education and treatment services at
the private prisons, the analysts, observed that after 'bothvendors
encountered difficulties fulfilling program participation obligations,
the CPC managers sought amended contracts to reduce these requirements
by more than half: from 7 6 5 prisoners to 325 at the CCA facility, and
from 1519 to 606 at Wackenhut. Contract payments to the vendors were
not reduced, however (Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government
Accountability 1998).
In 1999 OPPAGA undertook a review of the newest contract facility,
a prison for youthful offenders operated by CCA.

OPPAGA analysts noted

that this facility does not provide a greater'variety or number of
programs than the four other youthful offender institutions run by the
DOC (Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability
2000).

Comparing the education programs at the private facility with

those at the DOC-run prisons, the analysts determined that by the middle
of 1999 enrollment levels at the private prison were favorable,
especially for vocational training programs.

Youthful offenders in the

private facility earned GED certificates at a higher rate, compared with
juveniles in public facilities. A review of operational costs indicated
that while costs at the larger state youthful offender facilities were
lower due to economies of scale, the per diem costs €or the private
institution fell within the range of comparably-sized public facilities.
Finally, OPPAGA analysts compared Wackenhut's close-custody
prison, South Bay, with the state-operated Okeechobee. After adjusting
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for a variety of different factors to accaunt for important differences
I

in how the facilities were operated (e.g., the public prison had fewer
education and treatment programs and prisoner work crews provide
community services outside the prison clompound), it was determined that
a 6 percent cost savings had been achieved by the private prison in FY
,
1998-99, nearly meeting the statutory cost-savings benchmark of 7
percent.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The current project used a multi-level analysis to answer key
I

questions related to the impact of VOI/TIS on prison management and
privatization experiences. Analyses of national data for the past
decade, case studies of prison management and privatization were
conducted to answer the following questions:

0

What management changes have been made by state correctional
agencies in order to deal with the increase in the numbers of
violent offenders being incarcerated, many for much longer
periods than in the past?

0

What additional safety and training procedures have been
instituted for correctional staff in order to deal with the
increase in violent offenders?

0

How does the increase in violent offenders affect the type and
extent of programming (e.g., education, prison employment)
health care and safety procedures?

0

What types of offenders, programs, or services fall within
private corrections? What has been the experience of private
corrections in terms of inmate and officer safety, infractions,
accountability and costs?

LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT STUDY

As we noted in our national evaluation of the implementation and
early outcomes of VOI/TIS on crime rates, prison sentences, admissions,
and time served (see Turner et al. 2001:l~,the current evaluation also
operated under several constraints.

First, the current evaluation was

conducted relatively early in the implementation of VOI/TIS.

The

impacts of TIS legislation will not be felt until violent offenders
begin to serve the portions of their sentences that are beyond that
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which was historically served. Second, although we can examine the
differential effects of states that did and did not receive TIS funding,
we cannot determine the impact of VOI/TIS funds overall. This is
because all states received funding from the program. We do not have a
set of states, for comparison purposes, that did not participate in the
VOI/TIS program.

First, our evaluation was conducted early in the implementation of
VOI/TIS; the full impact of VOI/TIS will not be seen until years from

now.

States do not have to spend VOI/TIS funds during the year in which

they are received--theyhave up to four years from the year in which
they are awarded. Thus states have not yet built all the beds
originally envisioned for VOI/TIS offenders.

In addition, the impact of

TIS legislation will not be felt until violent offenders begin to s e m e
the portions of their sentences that are beyond that which was
historically served.

Second, although we can examine the differential

I

effects of states that did and did not receive TIS funding, we cannot
determine the impact of VOI/TIS funds overall. This is because all
states received funding from the program.

We do not have a set of

states, for comparison purposes, that did not participate in the VOI/TIS
program.

Thus, changes we observe over time may be due to other events,

sentencing changes, or national trends not associated with VOI/TIS.
In fact, this was often mentioned in our interviews for the.prison
management case studies--states are experiences many changes in
legislation that increase penalties--not just TIS legislation.

NATIONAL ANALYSES OF PRISON MANAGE-

TRENDS

We conducted analyses over time for states who received TIS
funding vs. those that did not, and for states with structured
sentencing--determinatesentencing or voluntary or presumptive
guidelines--versus indeterminate sentencing states, in order to identify
patterns that might differ among states with different sentencing
policies.
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Overall, our national analyses suggest one of two patterns.
I

Changes have been occurring in some measures over the past decade, but
some measures have remained fairly constant. We do not observe sharp
changes for TIS states about the time of many states were passing TIS
legislation in 1994.

In some instances, TIS states show higher levels

of prison management concerns (such as percent of inmates at high/close
custody, misconduct reports), but for other variables, non-TIS states
show higher levels (such as inmate assaults). We'didnot find strong
evidence for our hypotheses regarding the potential impact of TIS on
prison management variables.

This may be due to several reasons.

Averaging over states in these analyses may mask important state level
experiences.

In addition, data are available only during the first

several years after TIS legislation was passed in many states. As we
found in our national VOI/TIS evaluation, we may need to wait several
more years in order to gauge the impact of such sentencing policies.

PRISON MANAGEMENT CASE STUDY INTERVIEWS

Based on our case study interviews, it appears the VOI/TIS and
other get tough policies have had at least some impact on prison
management within individual states.

Most of our interviewees reported

longer sentences, greater numbers of older inmates, and increased
crowding. These conditions were not unanimously considered a direct
result of VOI/TIS, but were often considered the result of a rising
prison population-to which VOI/TIS has contributed. One consistent
theme was the anticipation that VOI/TIS and other get tough policies
would have an impact on prison management in the future. TIS and other
changes in sentencing policy are relatively new and most of our
respondents expect greater impact, in terms of crowding, aging inmates,
and costs, will be observed as more inmates are sentenced under the new
policies.
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PRIVATIZATION CASE STUDIES

The privatization case studies were designed to examine and
document management practices in state correctional systems with more
/ I

than a few years of experience with prison privatization, and to explore
whether the provisions of VOI/TIS, or other elements of the movement
promoting "get toughrtlegislation have affected how states approach the
issu,eof privatization.
F o r more than fifteen years private prison marketing efforts have

been built on assertions that they could deliver higher quality services
at a lower price than public correctional agencies. The public debates
about whether a state should include prison privatization among the
approaches taken to improve or expand the correctional system are
usually couched in terms of correctional costs and efficiency, but the
evidence to date does not offer solid support for the claims made by
proponents.

There are other factors, however, that underlie and

influence the decision process.
The decision to privatize prison operations is ultimately made in
the political arena, by legislators and governors, not by a state's
professional correctional managers.

Over the course of the fifteen-year

history of this industry, all states have faced huge increases in their
prison populations but fewer than half have chosen to address this
problem by contracting with private companies to build or manage state
prisons within their political boundaries.41 Regional political
traditions and the political cultures appear to play a predominant role

in determining whether a state will move to privatize its prisons.

For

example, almost all of the early contracts were let for facilities built
and operated in traditionally conservative "right-to-work"states, where
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,correctional labor unions are weak or non-existent and strong
bi-partisan support for private prisons prevails.

Specific VOI/TIS or

"get; tough" measures that have been incorporated in a state's criminal
/I

justice policies and practices do not appear to play a major role.
Our case studies show that private management of prisons is often
associated with specific patterns of shortcomings and deficiencies
(e.g., higher rates of staff turnover, problems with classification and
inmate discipline, deficient provision of basic services, higher rates
of violent assaults). Many of these problems can be traced to the
primary objective of the industry: to reap profits from the high-risk
business of operating prisons.

But once the political decision to

privatize is made, a state's correctional managers face a number of
administrative challenges, as we discuss below.
Considerations for Private Prisons

Given the strong financial incentives to cut costs in order
maximize profits while remaining llcompetitive,"
performance from private
prison contractors becomes a key issue. Some have argued that the
proper role of public correctional management in these transactions
should be to set high performance standards and outcome measures, and
then to stand back and let the private sector "innovate" its way toward
more efficient ways to do business.

As has been pointed out by Austin,

a review of the current state of private correctional practice reveals
I

scant evidence of innovation (Austin and Coventry 1999).

Private

companies have often hired veteran managers from the public corrections
systems. In Minnesota, private companies mimicked the public system in

41 Many states, e.g. , New York and Illinois, have no involvement
with prison privatization, though they may contract with for-profit
vendors of community corrections, halfway houses and the like, Some
states such as Hawaii and Wisconsin, have sent prisoners to be confined
in private prisons located elsewhere, but have not yet embraced the
concept of privately-operated prisons within their borders.
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some ways, while failing to provide required service delivery in a
number of areas (Greene 2000).
Given this experience, public managers should provide precisely
detailed prescriptions for every aspect of prison operations as they
issue requests for proposals and negotiate contracts. A review of the
experience with prison privatization in the three case-study states
suggests that such administrative practices are essential to managing
the risks and help to secure adequate levels of performance from private
prison vendors :

0

Clear and detailed specifications for every aspect of prison
operations need to be incorporated in "requests for proposalst8
for private prison operation to establish comprehensive
performance expectations and set an unambiguous.framework for
contracting, and for management oversight, monitoring, and
enforcement of contract requirements.

Contracts must

incorporate a detailed, enforceable staffing plan, and should
specify quantified performance measures for delivery of
security services, healthcare, and correctional programs.
0

Strict monitoring and enforcement are needed to enforce the
terms of the contract. This requires daily onsite monitoring
by a dedicated full-time experienced corrections professional;
careful documentation of operational deficiencies and problems;
and enforcement sanctions with specific monetary sanctions
(e.g., per diem adjustments) that will be triggered when
explicit performance benchmarks are not met.

A decade and a half of experience with privatization in the U.S.
evokes a number of other cautions for approaching correctional
privatization :
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A jurisdiction should not privatize so large a proportion of

institutional corrections that the system becomes dependent on
private management and cannot :bargainto its best advantage--or
/I

finds itself unable to take over prison operations (or absorb
the contracted population load) if things go wrong.

The

proportion of privatized prison operations in a jurisdiction
should therefore remain quite :low. The private prison beds
contracted by TDCJ comprise just 12 percent of the total TDCJ
bed capacity.42 While a state system as large as Texas may be
able to handle a risk of that magnitude, a smaller state might
find it hard to manage the risks of privatizing that large a
share of their system.

For the same reasons, jurisdictions

that chose to privatize prison operations should maintain
ownership of the facilities involved. This will help to avoid
impediments to converting private prisons to public management
if the costs of privatization (financial or political) prove to
be too high.
Jurisdictions should have clear and realistic objectives and
expectations. The consensus among credible researchers is that
the public cannot expect to obtain much--if any--tax-dollar
savings through privatization. Adequate funding for security
services and prison programs i d essential. Vendors who propose
I

per diems that appear (at least on paper) to produce
substantial savings may be bidding deliberately and
irresponsibly low.

Politicians who make expansive claims of

savings through privatization are probably ignoring the
inevitable hidden costs, such as increased complaints of
improper treatment in private facilities.

42 The total number of private prison beds is 19,245, but that
figure is for "secure facilities," and does not include halfway-house or
community-based drug treatment beds.
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Jurisdictions should not contract for prison beds outside of
their political boundaries, nor- should they allow sspecll
prisons to be built or operated within them.

The track record

/I

amassed by private prison operators that contract for
out-of-state prisoners is especially poor.

The logistics of

monitoring and enforcing contracts for beds located hundreds or
thousands of miles away are difficult. The lack of adequate
local and state jurisdictional control over "spec" prisons has
given rise to a set of operational, legal, and political
problems that have not been sufficiently addressed by any host
jurisdiction to date.
Private prison contractors should be required to pay prevailing
wages and provide comparable benefit levels for private prison
staff. At the time of our study, the strains placed by a
strong economy on the correctional labor pool were affecting
public prison systems adversely--especially in states like
Texas, where the prison system expanded at a rate that has
stripped a labor market that was already extremely tight.
Private prison operators that offer lower compensation for line
staff than is afforded them by public correctional agencies
{whether to effect savings or to increase profits) found it
increasingly difficult to fill staff vacancies and cover key
security posts.

In many private prisons the result has been a

security force that is under-qualified, insufficiently
experienced, and exhausted though excessive, involuntary
overtime.
Given the patterns of structural deficiencies mentioned above,
the best results with private prison operations are achieved by
limiting contractors to provision of housing and services €or
the least challenging prisoners.

This means restricting the

private market to relatively low-security prisoners who are not
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prone to violence, and who are nearing the end of their prison
sentences and therefore have every incentive for good behavior.
The track record is not encouraging where public managers have
not taken great care in selection of candidates for transfer to
private prisons, or where vendors have been willing to accept
prisoners beyond their management capacity. This has been
especially true in instances where prisoner classification
tools were defective or overridden by conkingent circumstances,
or where prisoners in need of expensive, individualized
services (juvenile offenders, mentally ill prisoners) were
transferred to private facilities that were not equipped to
address their needs.

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, our analyses suggest that VOI/TIS may not be having a
I

major impact to date on prison management issues and privatization.
Longer term historical trends have been impacting prison management over
the past decade.

The use of privatization has been very modest under

VOI/TIS and may be related more to political than to administrative
correctional decisions.
Although our analyses did not reveal large impacts on prison
management at the national level, it is possible to provide more precise
information on several prison management topics at the individual state
levell.

For example, by examining differences in inmate participation in

programming, inmate grievances, and assaults in states where portions of
similar inmates are sentenced under TIS and non-TIS laws, we may be able
to observe a clearer impact of such policies.

Such analyses have been

conducted in North Carolina (Memory et al. 1999) and currently being
investigated by RAND using data from Washington State.
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RAND STUDY TELEPHONE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

,
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PRISON MANAGEMENT
1.

1

Loncr Sentences.

Is your state experiencing an increase in the

number of inmates who are required to serve long sentences with
restrictions on early release?

If so, what do you think is the cause of

this increase in long-term inmates? Are there any particular
characteristics these inmates share, such as youth, violent convictions,
I

or dxug convictions?
2.

Special Pomlations. Has there been an increase in inmates

with special needs, such as physical or mental health care, or drug
treatment?

Has your state experienced or is it anticipating an increase

in older inmates?

If so, are any preparations or plans being made for

the medical care, housing, and/or management of this gnoup of inmates?
3.

.

Inmate Classification. Does it. seem that Truth in Sentencing

(TIS) or other "get toughtfsentencing policies have impacted inmate
classification, such as how it is conducted, factors considered in
determining classification, number of classification hearings, or amount
of paperwork involved in the process?

Was there been a change in the

share of inmates at each classification level, such as more inmates
classified at higher custody levels?
4. Costs.

Has there been an increase in the cost of

incarceration due to TIS or other "get tough" sentencing policies?

If

so, in what categories have costs have increased (for example, total
dollars, health care, segregation, administration, and programming)?
What do you think is the cause of this increase in costs?
5.

Crowdinq. Have prisons in your state become more crowded in

recent years?

If

SO,

how much of this do you think is related to TIS or

other "get tough" policies?

How do these policies make prisons more

crowded (for example, limiting early release, sentencing more inmates to
prison, sentencing inmates to longer terms)?

Has it become necessary

(or has consideration been given) to grdnting early release to some
inmates to make room for long-term or higher risk inmates?

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view
expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

i

-

6.

119

-

,

I

I

I

Safetv. Has there been a change in the safety of prisons,

,

I

such as an increase in inmate-on-inmateor inmate-on-'staffassaults?
Have there been increases in infradtions or other disciplinary actions
taken against inmates for disruptive behavior?

If the level of safety

has changed, have much of this seems to be related to TIS or other "get
,
toughtl policies? Have additional safety and training procedures or

/

4

policies regarding the use of force been considered or implemented? If

so, what do you think brought about these changes?'
7.

Grievances.

or lawsuits?

Has there been an increase in inmate grievances

If so, has there been an increase in any,particular types

of grievance or law suit, such as issues related to crowding,
classification, programming or medical services? To what extent does it
seem that TIS and other "get tough1'policies are responsible for this?
8.

Staff ResDonse. Have staff workloads or schedules changed as

a result of TIS or other Itgettough" policies?

Have changes in the
1 ,

composition of the prison population affected staff morale, stress
levels, absenteeism, and attitudes? Has staff turnover, disability
claims, or retirement levels changed? Have correctional officers'
associations or unions sought to make any changes, such as increased
safety training or staffing levels?
9.

Health Care. What are the major health concerns among your

state's prison population?

Do you think TIS or other Itgettough"

policies have influenced these concerns (for example the availability of
or access to care or treatment for assault injuries)?
state's policies for testing inmates for TB and HIV?

What are your
Has there been an

increase in the share of inmates infected with TB or HIV?
10.

Inmate Proqramming. Does it seem that changes in sentencing

policy or changes in prison populations (if any) have affected the type
or availability of programming, such as work, education, and treatment

opportunities?
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PRIVATIZATION
1. Number of Private Facilities.

How many private facilities

operate in your state and who operates them? Were any of them aspecll
facilities?

How many inmates are'housed in these facilities? Do these

populations include inmates from different jurisdictions? Do you think
that,private facilities have been used 'to accommodate changes in the
prison population resulting from TIS or other "get toughEgsentencing
policies?
2.

Inmate Characteristics and Prosrammins. What process is used

to a.ssign inmates to private or public facilities? What types of
programs and services are available in ]private facilities? How do these
programs and services compare to those of public facilities?
3.

Out of State Private Placements. Are inmates being held at

out-of-state private facilities? How are these facilities selected?
Have out-of-state facilities been utilized in the past?

How were they

selected? What was the experience with this type of contracting?
4.

Staff Oualifications. How do the staff working in private

facilities compare to staff at public facilities in terms of training,
experience, salary and benefits, turnover, and morale?
5.

Phvsical Plant. How do the physical accommodations, medical

services, amenities, and inmate activities compare between public and
private facilities?
6.

Securitv. How do security and safety levels compare between

public and private facilities?
7.

Costs.

How do the costs compare between public and private

facilities? If they are different, how are they different and why do
you think that is so?
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AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION (ACA) SURVEY OF DEPARTMENTS OF
CORRECTIONS
I
,
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RAND / AMERICAN CORRECTIONALASSOCIATION EVALUATION
OF VIOLENT OFFENDER INCARCERATION AND TRUTH IN SENTENCING GRANTS
I

RAND,a non-profit research organization in Santa Monica, California, is conducting an evaluation for the
National Institute of Justice on the Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth in Sentencing (VOI/TIS) grants
awarded as part the 1994 Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. The grants provide funds
to state and local correctional systems to expand their capacity to incarcerate violent offenders with more
certainty, and to impose longer and more determinate sentences. As a means of determining how individual
states respond, RAND is tracking legislative, policy, and operational changes,atthe state and local level.

In collaboration with RAND, the American Correctional Association is surveying state departments of

i

corrections to gather information about implementation and expectations concerning VOVTIS funding, as well
as the impact of Truth-in-Sentencinglaws, and other recent legislation, on state correctional populations. The
survey includes items on recent changes in the types and numbers of prison beds added with VOI/IIS funds,
the length of sentences imposed and served, the effects on jail and prison admissions and population
characteristics, inmate activities and programs, prison staffing and prison opkfations.
The next page gives a summary of VOI/TIS funding for your state. Please answer the questions on the pages
that follow as accurately as possible, as they apply in your state. This survey is being mailed to all fifty states
and to U.S.temtories. Your answers will be analyzed along with responses from other departments of
corrections.
Please fax your completed survey form to (301) 918-1900, to the attention of Bob Levinson. If you pEfer to
mail your response to us, please send the completed form to:
' I

American Correctional Association
Attention: Bob Levinson
4380 Forbes Blvd
Lanham MD 20706

If you have questions about this survey, please call Bob Levinson at (301) 918-1800 x1876.

YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS
Name:
Title:
Jurisdiction:

Address:

Telephone:

Fax:
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I. VOYTXS Budgets and Bed Capacity
Of the total VOI/TIS funds your state has received since 1996, how much has been spent to
date?
H o w many beds of the following types have been added in your state using VOJfTIS funds? (Enter the number of beds in

the appropriate boxes.)

I

Adult

Juvenile

Total

I1

Prison
Minimum security
Medium security
Maximum security
SuperMax facilities
Leased from private companies
Other

I

I

Local'
Jail
Leased from private companies
Other
Other
How much of the increase in beds was accomplished by VOVTIS funds
in each of the following ways?
Building new facilities
Retrofithg existing institutions
Expanding capacity in existing institutions
Leasing beds from private companies
Other

Between

About

Bemeen

None

149%

50%

5149%

0
0
0
0

0
lY
0

0
0
0
0
0

CI

0
0

100%

0

0

13

I3

0
0

0
0
0

13

11. Sentencing and Time Served
What is the average prison sentence length imposed today and in
1993?*
Length of sentence Overall
(in months)
Violent offenses
Property offenses
Drug offenses
Other offenses
What is the prison time actually served today and in 1993?*
Length of sentence Overall
(in months)
Violent offenses
Property offenses
Drug offenses
Other offenses

* If 1998 data are not available, use the most recent year for which data are available.
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This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view
expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

1

1993

Expected 1998

U

II
I 1

111. VOI/TIS Effects on PrisodJaiI Admissions
Since 1996 (when VOUTIS funding first became available to your state), what change has occurred in each of the following
areas, andlhow much of the change do you feel is attributable to VOI/TIS?
Substantiallv
Decreased-

Substantially

Decreased

No
Change

hcreased

0
0
0
0
0
0

0

0

0

0

0
0
0
0
0
0

13

0
0
0
0
0
0

U

0
0
0
0

Number of beds available to state corrections

Increased

Attributable
to voms

0

Minimum security

'I

Medium security
Maximum security
SuperMax facilities

Leased from private companies
Other
Number of beds available to local corrections
Minimum security
Medium security

Maximumsec~ty
Leased from private companies
Other

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

%

D

0

I

Prisoners newly admitted

D

0

0
0
0
0

rl

I3

I3

0
0
0

Females

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0

0

U

0
0
0
0

Aged 50 and older

D

U

0

D

D

With drug or alcohol treatment needs
With physical health problems

0
0

With mentaI health problems

0

For violent offenses
For property offenses
For drug offenses
For other offenses
Adults

Youths sentenced as adults
Juveniles
Males
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IV. VOYTIS Effects on Prison Population
Since 1996 (when VOZETIS funding first became available to your state), what change has O C C U K ~within the overall
prison population in each of the following areas, and how much of the change do you fael is attributable to VOmIS?
Decreased

Decreased

No
Change

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

Offenders with physical health problems

0

Offenders with mental health problems

0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0

Offenders with drug or alcohol treatment needs

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Substantially

Violent offenders
Property offenders

Drug offenders
Other offenders
Adults

Youths sentenced as adults
Juveniles

Mala
Females
Offenders aged 50 and older

Increased

0
0
0

0

SubStantidy
Increased

Attributable
to voms

0
0
0

d

%,

%

i:

0
0

%,

0
0

0
0
0
0

0

%,

D

D

%,

0
0
0
0

0

0
0

0

0

IO

%,

%

%

0

0

0

-%

V. VOYTIS Effects on Prison Inmate Activities and Programs
Since 1996 (when VOI/ITS funding fxst became available to your state), what change has occurred in each of the foilowing
areas, and how much of the change do you feel is attributable to VOI/TIS?
substantially
Decreased

Inmates who work regularly

0

Inmates being educated regularly

0
0

Inmates with outside recreation (yard
privileges)
Inmates with visitation privileges
Inmate drug treatment programs
Inmate drug testing
Inmates who test positive for drug use
Inmate gang activity
Inmate appeals
Inmates housed in secure units
Inmates double-bunked

D

0
0
0
0
0
0

Inmate infractions

0
D
D

Inmate assaults on staff

0

Inmates triple-bunked
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Deaeased

No
Change

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0
0

tl
0
0
0

0
0
0

substantially
hcreased

0
0

lnneased

0

0

0
0

tl

D

0

0
0
0

0
0

D

0
U
0
0
0

I
3

U

a

0

U

U
U
D

Attributable
to v

om

-70m-

?6

-6

VI. VOYTIS Effects on Prison Staffing
Since 1996 (when VOI/TIS funding first became available to your state), what change has occurred in each of the following
area, andhow much of the change do you feel is attributable to VOUTIS?
Substantially
Decreased

Number of staff
Male staff
Female staff

13
D

"

0
0
0
0
0
c3
0

Staff qualifications
Hours worked by staff
Hours of stafftraining
security braining
Physical training
Other training

Substantially
Increased

No
Decreased

c3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Change

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0'

U

0
CI
U

0
0
0
CI
0

VII. VOYTIS Effects on Operations
Since 1996 (when VOVITS funding fmt became available to your state), what change has occurred in each of the f o l l 0 6 ~
areas, and how much of the change do you feel is attributableto VODTIS?

Use of good timdgain time
Use of parole
Post-release supervision (other than parole)
Inmate classification
For risk
For programming needs
For prison management

Substantially
Decreased

No

SUbQUthUY

Decreased

Chge

0
0

lnaeased

0
0

D

I3

0
0
0
0

0
0
c7
0

0
0
0
0
0
U
0

0
0
0
0
CI
0
0

h

m

0
0
CI
U
0
0
CI

Attributable
to v o m

%,
%,

%,

-%
%,
%
%,

WIT. Additional Comments
Please list any obstacles or issues that have arisen in your state in the implementation of
VOYTIS:

What changes in your state's response(s) to VOI/"IS would you like to see?

Thank you!

<< You may elaborate your reply to any question >>
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States Responding to the ACA Survey

TIS
Arizona
California
Connecticut
Florida
I11inois
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana
Maine
Mime sota
Mississippi
Missouri
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Tennessee
Utah
Virginia
Washinqton

Non-TIS
Alabama
Arkansas
Colorado
District of Columbia
Idaho
Indiana
Kentucky
Massachusetts
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Vermont
Wisconsin
Wyoming
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